Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine, Vol 58, No. 357, July 1845 — John Shaqi
Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine, Vol 58, No. 357, July 1845Various
History
Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine, Vol 58, No. 357, July 1845
Various
England -- Periodicals; Scotland -- Periodicals
military success, at least in any cause in which it could sympathize,
hailed with transports of joy this first revival of triumph in support
of the Protestant faith, and over that power with whom, for centuries,
they had maintained so constant a rivalry.
The campaign of 1703 was not fruitful of great events. Taught, by the
untoward issue of the preceding one, the quality of the general and army
with whom he had to contend, the French general cautiously remained on
the defensive; and so skilfully were the measures of Marshal Boufflers
taken, that all the efforts of Marlborough were unable to force him to a
general action. The war in Flanders was thus limited to one of posts and
sieges; but in that the superiority of the Allied arms was successfully
asserted, Parliament having been prevailed on to consent to an
augmentation of the British contingent. But a treaty having been
concluded with Sweden, and various reinforcements having been received
from the lesser powers, preparations were made for the siege of Bonn, on
the Rhine, a frontier town of Flanders, of great importance from its
commanding the passage of that artery of Germany, and stopping, while in
the enemy's hands, all transit of military stores or provisions for the
use of the armies in Bavaria, or on the Upper Rhine. The batteries
opened with seventy heavy guns and English mortars on the 14th May 1704;
a vigorous sortie with a thousand foot was repulsed, after having at
first gained some success, on the following day, and on the 16th two
breaches having been declared practicable, the garrison surrendered at
discretion. After this success, the army moved against Huys, and it was
taken with its garrison of 900 men on the 23d August. Marlborough and
the English generals, after this success, were decidedly of opinion that
it would be advisable at all hazard to attempt forcing the French lines,
which were strongly fortified between Mehaigne and Leuwe, and a strong
opinion to that effect was transmitted to the Hague on the very day
after the fall of Huys.[7] They alleged with reason, that the Allies
being superior in Flanders, and the French having the upper hand in
Germany and Italy, it was of the utmost importance to follow up the
present tide of success in the only quarter where it flowed in their
favour, and counterbalance disasters elsewhere, by decisive events in
the quarter where it was most material to obtain it. The Dutch
government, however, set on getting a barrier for themselves, could not
be brought to agree to this course, how great soever the advantages
which it promised, and insisted instead, that he should undertake the
siege of Limbourg, which lay open to attack. This was accordingly done;
the trenches were commenced in the middle of September, and the garrison
capitulated on the 27th of the same month: a poor compensation for the
total defeat of the French army, which would in all probability have
ensued if the bolder plan of operation he had so earnestly counselled
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