Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine, Vol 58, No. 357, July 1845Various
History
Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine, Vol 58, No. 357, July 1845
Various
England -- Periodicals; Scotland -- Periodicals
conscious of powers to do great things, and proud of fame already
acquired, was willing to yield what was necessary for the common good to
the other. They had no rivalry, save a noble emulation who should do
most for the common cause in which they were jointly engaged. From the
moment of their junction it was agreed that they should take the command
of the whole army day about; and so perfectly did their views on all
points coincide, and so entirely did their noble hearts beat in unison,
that during eight subsequent campaigns that they for the most part acted
together, there was never the slightest division between them, nor any
interruption of the harmony with which the operations of the Allies were
conducted.
The French position was in places strong, and their disposition for
resistance at each point where they were threatened by attack from the
Allied forces, judicious; but there was a fatal defect in its general
conception. Marshal Tallard was on the right, resting on the Danube,
which secured him from being turned in that quarter, having the village
of BLENHEIM in his front, which was strongly garrisoned by twenty-six
battalions and twelve squadrons, all native French troops. In the centre
was the village of Oberglau, which was occupied by fourteen battalions,
among whom were three Irish corps of celebrated veterans. The
communication between Blenheim and Oberglau was kept up by a screen
consisting of eighty squadrons, in two lines, having two brigades of
foot, consisting of seven battalions, in its centre. The left, opposite
Prince Eugene, was under the orders of Marshal Marsin, and consisted of
twenty-two battalions of infantry and thirty-six squadrons, consisting
for the most part of Bavarians and Marshal Marsin's men, posted in front
of the village of Lutzingen. Thus the French consisted of sixty-nine
battalions and a hundred and thirty-four squadrons, and were posted in a
line strongly supported at each extremity, but weak in the centre, and
with the wings, where the great body of the infantry was placed, at such
a distance from each other, that, if the centre was broken through, each
ran the risk of being enveloped by the enemy, without the other being
able to render them any assistance. This danger as to the troops in
Blenheim, the flower of their army, was much augmented by the
circumstance, that if their centre was forced where it was formed of
cavalry only, and the victors turned sharp round towards Blenheim, the
horse would be driven headlong into the Danube, and the foot in that
village would run the hazard of being surrounded or pushed into that
river, which was not fordable, even for horse, in any part. But though
these circumstances would, to a far-seeing general, have presaged
serious disaster in the event of defeat, yet the position was strong in
itself, and the French generals, long accustomed to victory, had some
excuse for not having taken sufficiently into view the contingencies
likely to occur in the event of defeat.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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