But we have now arrived at a point when that plain and straightforward question, common to Englishmen to ask, may be put to us—and that is, What is to be done with the colonies, situated as they are? Connected with this, too, is another question, equally necessary to be answered, which is—What is Great Britain likely to lose, in possessions, people, and character, with the Canadas, if she loses them? With regard to the latter question, which, as it is suggestive of the consequences to be provided against, it may be better to consider before that which is suggestive of a remedy—it seems clear enough to us, that the loss of all the North American colonies would inevitably follow that of the Canadas. The situation of all of them is the same. Free trade has affected them nearly equally; and it is a significant fact, that the agitation upon the subject of “annexation,” without concert, common interests, or agreement, commenced in all the provinces simultaneously, though not to the same extent in some as in others. But, apart from this, if the great province of Upper Canada should take leave of Britain, the following of the others would be as natural as the limbs following the dictates of the head. It is indeed useless to waste words upon a matter that is perfectly self-evident; for if the Canadas separate from Britain, it must and will go forth to the world, that they had to do so in order to prosper; and all the colonies being dissatisfied, and chafing under the same mortifications, and suffering the same injuries from England’s free-trade policy, would claim, upon the same grounds, to be relieved of the withering shadow of her power in America. However uncomplimentary or unjust this may or might be, such will be the opinion of the world, and Great Britain must prepare to meet it, or to counteract what will occasion it. As misfortunes, too, do not come single with a nation more than with an individual, the West Indian possessions would assuredly follow the North American; and would certainly not give any more complimentary reasons for doing so. Great Britain would therefore stand forth before the rest of her colonies and the world, as having utterly and humiliatingly failed to govern those she lost with that success which ought to result from her free institutions, and the freedom of her people. Now this momentous consideration is clearly bound up with that of what she is to do with the Canadas. Now, will Great Britain—by whatsoever cause or policy they may justify their claim for separation, or by whatsoever party in England it may be or may have been favoured—permit the Canadas to shake off her power, with these consequences palpably before her eyes? Will she not the rather prefer coming back to that best of all systems—mutual sacrifices for common good, and mutual concessions for national integrity and destiny? Will she not rather endeavour to impart to them that capital and those people, which would benefit her much, and make