It would be exceedingly instructive if we could exact from each candidate a distinct definition of the meaning which he attaches to the term “Liberal principles.” We observe from the Edinburgh newspapers that a gentleman, professing “liberal principles,” proposes to contest the representation of the Montrose burghs with Mr Joseph Hume—the inference being, that the principles of the said Joseph are not sufficiently liberal! Then, at Paisley, a candidate recommended by the same Joseph Hume, and that superlative twaddler Sir Joshua Walmsley, comes forward, on “liberal principles,” to oppose Mr Hastie, whom we have hitherto been accustomed to regard as rather in advance of the Whigs. The Radicals of Perth did not think Mr Fox Maule “liberal” enough for them, since they brought forward an opponent in the person of a certain Mr Gilpin; and now that Mr Maule has succeeded to the peerage, the gentleman who next solicits the suffrages of the Fair City in his place, must make up his mind to compare his “liberal principles” with those of the Gilpin. Not long ago a well-known Whig citizen and civic functionary of Edinburgh declared himself opposed to any further extension of the suffrage, thereby intimating his dissent from the principle of Lord John Russell’s Bill; and yet, at a meeting lately held for the purpose of selecting a candidate, this same individual moved a resolution to the effect that the candidate ought to be a man professing “liberal opinions!” Really there is something ludicrous and intensely absurd in this general employment of a phrase which can be made to mean almost anything. Is a man in favour of a republic, abolition of the House of Peers, suppression of the Church, and repudiation of the national debt? Then he is undoubtedly a man of “liberal principles.” Is he merely for household suffrage, electoral divisions, vote by ballot, and triennial parliaments? He is likewise of “liberal principles.” Is he a thick-and-thin supporter of Lord John Russell, having held a place under the late Government? Who so ready as he to lay claim to “liberal principles.” Does he wish the separation of Church and State? “Liberal” again. Does he back up the Papacy in their insolent attempts at aggression, and defend the grant of Maynooth? He does so on “liberal principles.” Does he wish to see the Jews in Parliament? He vindicates that wish on the score of “liberal principles.” Now, surely, unless logic is an art as lying as that of chiromancy, it cannot be that all the men holding such conflicting opinions are entitled to the name of Liberals, or to claim credit to themselves for entertaining “liberal opinions.” If so, who is illiberal? But it is not worth while to comment further upon a point so very obvious as this. If Liberalism means contemplated overthrow and anarchy, we make the gentlemen who profess such principles as welcome to their title as was the late Thomas Paine, when he too arrogated to himself, in his isolation, the name of Liberal.