of the whole country, how could a Ministry be formed which would combine in opposition to the present occupants of the Treasury Bench—those publicly pledged persons who would insist on being included in the new Government? And by whom are they to be led? What are the measures which they would propose, and be likely to carry? Will Lord Palmerston, Lord John Russell, Sir James Graham, Mr Gladstone, go into the same lobby with Mr Hume, Mr Cobden, and Mr Bright, on a motion in favour of a great extension of the suffrage, vote by ballot, triennial parliaments, or the destruction of the Irish Church?—or on a motion of simple want of confidence in Ministers? And if Mr Villiers, or any other member, should propose a resolution expressive of the determination of the House not to sanction any measures calculated to interfere with or reverse the policy of the year 1846, who shall tell the fate of it in the then existing complication and character of the House of Commons, with such various shades of opinion on fiscal and economical questions? Who shall expect a majority to agree on what will constitute a prejudicial or unjustifiable interference with that policy? And suppose Ministers should distinctly avow that it was not their intention to propose measures directly or indirectly aimed at such interference or reversal? Suppose a considerable number of members should be found concurring generally in the Free Trade policy, but also believing that the manner in which it was introduced and established was unjust, and injurious to great interests in the country, and anxious to repair such injustice, and mitigate the admitted sufferings of the agriculturists? This is the opinion of Lord Shelburne, and doubtless of many men of moderate opinions, though formally opposed to the present Government. Suppose, on the other hand, the Minister, in answer to such a motion, should be prepared to intimate generally a policy likely to be received with favour in the House of Commons and out of doors; and either move the previous question, or boldly meet the motion with a direct negative, and _successfully_? Their hands would have been immensely strengthened by their opponents, for the remainder of the Session—perhaps for many succeeding Sessions. All these, and many other cognate considerations, will be taken calmly into account by the more astute tacticians of the Liberal party; and, in our opinion, shrewder counsels will prevail than those which would herald in an immediately aggressive policy on the part of her Majesty’s motley opposition. With the very best hostile intentions, they would lack arms and opportunity. We concur in every word of the following passage, which fell from the lips of Mr Disraeli at Aylesbury, so long ago as the 14th instant. “We shall carry out our views with more efficiency, and, I believe, with more success, in the new Parliament—when the Ministry will no longer have to meet a hostile Parliament, or be restrained in its policy by an overpowering