measures, from the very beginning when the squadrons appeared in the Bay of Salamis to their entering the Black Sea, originated exclusively with the French Government. The despatch of Lord Cowley of the 28th January confirmed the intelligence published in the London papers, that it was the French Government who had invited the English to join the French fleet in the expedition to the Greek waters, and the fact is corroborated in the despatch of the French Minister of Foreign Affairs to his ambassador in London, dated the 5th June. Again, on the 13th July the French Ambassador proposed to Lord Clarendon that, in the event of Russia not accepting the Vienna note, or showing a disposition to persist in a violent policy, the French and English fleets should forthwith enter the Dardanelles. That proposition was repeated in the beginning of September by the French Government; and once more, on the 23d of the same month, Count Walewski urged the presence of the fleets in the Black Sea as _indispensable_. On this important point there was not the slightest divergence of opinion between the head of the French Government and his Minister of Foreign Affairs; their views were the same, their opinions identical; and the _Blue Books_ prove no fact to be more indisputable, more certain, than that their conduct throughout the whole of the affair was frank and straightforward. It is not alone in the French despatches that we find this proof. We see it in the correspondence of Lord Aberdeen and Lord Cowley. The latter noble lord, who had the best opportunity of ascertaining the truth, and who is not a person to be easily deceived, repeatedly informs his Government that he invariably received from the Emperor, or from his minister, the same assurances of a desire to act in concert and in cordial alliance with England, and that he never could discover, though he was evidently on the watch, the slightest difference between them. It is all very well to say that the time which has been spent in, as it now appears, useless negotiation, has not been lost, and that the Government has been enabled to prepare the means of resisting the encroachments of Russia, and of wresting from her the territory she has seized. It is a poor defence to allege that fortune has, after all, favoured us, and that we are not in so bad a condition as we might have been. A blunder is not the less a blunder because its results are not so mischievous as they might be. But if we are prepared at this moment, as there can be little doubt, the credit is not due to Ministers, who have exhibited throughout a credulity and a simplicity we believe to be unexampled. We have no reason to believe that if, in the very commencement, a firm and imposing attitude had been assumed by our Government, the Emperor of Russia would not have recoiled before he had yet placed himself in a position, to retire from which, without striking a blow, is shame and dishonour. Had