We have no desire whatever to reflect upon the conduct of the prudence of Sir Hamilton Seymour, but we cannot help saying that he seems to have missed one very material point—that being _a distinct explanation of the quarter from which the anticipated danger to Turkey was to arise_. Sir Hamilton was perfectly justified in intimating that Britain did not intend to subvert the integrity of Turkey, and that she would not be passive if France were to manifest such a design. There was no earthly danger from either quarter; and certainly Austria, whatever she may wish to have or is ready to receive, would not have dared, under existing circumstances, to disturb the peace of Europe. Turkey itself was in a far better position than it ever had been. “L’homme gravement malade,” was exhibiting every symptom of convalescence, and the only danger to be apprehended was from the Muscovite doctor, who, without being summoned, was preparing to administer his pills. Therefore, we think that the rejoinder to the Emperor’s confidences—subject, of course, to the official Cabinet approval—should have been in the shape of a query as to the nature of the apprehended danger. The Czar had protested, in the most emphatic language, that he was “eager for the prolonged existence of the man;” and, if that were the case, his dissolution was an event much less likely than that of many a dynasty of Christian Europe. With Russia and Britain as determined protectors, who was to give him the _coup-de-grace_? Surely Sir Hamilton Seymour erred in not putting that point more forcibly and distinctly in his confidential conversations with the Emperor. We say this, because the last paragraph in Sir Hamilton Seymour’s despatch, of 22d January 1853, to Lord John Russell shows that he was not altogether uninfluenced by the Imperial blandishments and affectation of perfect sincerity. “A noble triumph would be obtained by the civilisation of the nineteenth century if the void left by the extinction of Mahommedan rule in Europe could be filled up without an interruption of the general peace, in consequence of the precautions adopted by the two principal Governments the most interested in the destinies of Turkey.” Precautions indeed! Precautions which would have made Russia, without assuming the name of proprietor, the virtual and absolute occupier of Constantinople, with the power of the keys of the Bosphorus! It is marvellous that so acute a minister as Sir Hamilton Seymour—who otherwise deserves great praise for his lucid exposition of the designs and motives of the Czar—did not perceive that any approach to an arrangement for disposing of the inheritance, was tantamount to a declaration of the immediate dissolution of Turkey.