“To these cautions Her Majesty’s Government wish to add, that in their view it is essential that the Sultan should be advised to treat his Christian subjects in conformity with the principles of equity and religious freedom which prevail generally among the enlightened nations of Europe. The more the Turkish Government adopts the rules of impartial law and equal administration, the less will the Emperor of Russia find it necessary to apply that exceptional protection which his Imperial Majesty has found so burdensome and inconvenient, though no doubt prescribed by duty and sanctioned by treaty. We observe that the _Times_, notwithstanding its notorious ministerial leaning, has declined awarding praise to this state document, and we are not surprised at it. It is dissuasive and declinatory, but it is altogether feeble. We should have expected to find in it, not hypocritical acknowledgments of Imperial moderation and so forth, but a distinct, firm, and energetic protest against any attempt to disturb the peace, or to violate the integrity of Turkey. The infamous proposals made to Britain—for they were infamous not only as regarded Turkey but other European powers—should have been rejected in a manner that could have left no doubt in the mind of the Czar as to the part which the British Government was prepared to take in the event of his entering into hostilities with the Sultan. From the beginning to the end of this despatch there is not a single word which can be construed into a plain warning to the Czar, that any attempt made by him upon Turkey would provoke the hostility of Britain. On the contrary, the declinature to participate in the scheme is mainly founded on the fact that no “actual crisis” has yet arrived; but there is nothing said to indicate that Britain would oppose the forcing on of such a crisis, if Russia thought proper to precipitate it; and a more unlucky expression than “_that the event which was contemplated is not definitely fixed in point of time_” it is utterly impossible to conceive. The perusal of this despatch could leave no other impression upon the mind of the Czar, than that the British Ministry were afraid to commit themselves by entering into any secret or separate treaty with Russia for the disposal of the Turkish dominions, until a crisis actually should occur. That they would have preferred the maintenance of the _status quo_ to a disturbance of it, was tolerably clear; but it was not in the least degree clear that they would take umbrage at an act of aggression, or be indisposed to treat with Russia after the aggression was made, and the weakness of the Ottoman empire exhibited by its being forced to succumb to the attack of the northern Colossus. The despatch, in short, was not couched in such manly, distinct, and positive terms as a British Secretary of State for foreign affairs should have employed on such an occasion. It is weak,