We have already commented upon the course which was pursued by the Ministry from the time when they were apprized of the designs of the Czar, down to that when the Danubian Principalities were invaded. We have expressed our opinion that a serious remonstrance, coupled with a plain intimation that Great Britain would not permit an occupation of the Turkish territory, would have sufficed during the earlier part of last year, and before any overt step was taken, to have deterred the Czar from proceeding with his project. We ground that view upon the policy which has been invariably pursued by Russia—which is to bully and cajole, not to fight. Let us grant that the possession of Constantinople is the darling project of the Czar—let us grant that, in order to attain it, he would run considerable risk, and submit to extraordinary sacrifices; still we are of opinion that had he been aware, before utterly committing himself, that he would be opposed by the combined forces of Britain and France, he never would have plunged into the contest. See what he risks. First, the annihilation of his fleets, both in the Baltic and in the Black Sea, for he can hardly hope to contend with Britain and France upon the waters. Next, the derangement and stoppage of trade, so vital to the real interests of Russia, and equivalent to a sentence of bankruptcy against many of her nobles and merchants, who depend entirely upon the amount and continuance of their exports. Then there are the chances of insurrection in Poland, and revolt in Finland; and the certainty that Russia, if worsted, will be so dismembered as to prevent her from again disturbing the peace of Europe. These are very serious considerations; and we may be certain that the Czar, great as his appetite undoubtedly is for appropriation, would rather have foregone his purposes upon Turkey, than have proceeded had he believed that the two Western powers would be firm and united in their resistance. Indeed, singular as it may appear, we are about to engage in a war for which no one country in Europe is desirous. Britain, with her eight hundred millions of debt, is by no means desirous to increase the burden of taxation, or to imperil or impede that commerce to which she owes so much of her greatness. In like manner France has no interest to go to war, for she also is heavily burdened, and the present Emperor has nothing so much at heart as to restore the state of the finances. Austria has anything but an interest that war should take place, for in that event, if she takes the side of Russia, there will be immediate insurrection both in Hungary and Lombardy; and if she takes the other side, she must quarrel with a very old partner in iniquity. Prussia has no interest, for the age of subsidies has gone by, and she is likely to suffer to whichever side she adheres; but most especially if she adopts the cause of Russia. Neutral she cannot remain. We need