not say that Turkey, the state which is attacked, does not desire war; and we are thoroughly convinced that the Czar, were he not committed so deeply, would be glad to withdraw his pretensions. Now, who suffered him to commit himself so deeply? We answer, the Coalition Ministry. Had they been of one accord among themselves, nothing of this kind would have happened. If Lord Aberdeen had been sole and supreme master in his Cabinet, it is possible that Russia might have succeeded in acquiring a protectorate over Turkey. The Sultan could hardly have attempted to resist without powerful European aid; and France, had she found Britain lukewarm or indifferent, could not be expected to come forward as the defender of the balance of power without a single ally. No doubt, had this occurred, it would have given Russia a most dangerous preponderance in Europe, and probably necessitated a future struggle; but, in the mean time, there would have been no war. Had the Cabinet been under the guidance of Palmerston or Russell, the first advances of the Emperor, if made at all, would have been met by a distinct and peremptory refusal, and by a threat which would have effectually deterred him from moving a step further. But unfortunately—most unfortunately for us, and for our children, and for the general peace of Europe, this is _not_ a united Cabinet. It is a congregation of men holding totally opposite opinions—bred up in adverse schools—adhering to antagonistical traditions—influenced by jealousy among themselves—and unable, upon any one important point, whether it relates to foreign or domestic policy, to arrive at a common conclusion. Take the case now before us. But for Palmerston and Russell, and their other adherents in the Cabinet, Lord Aberdeen might have established the principle of non-interference between Russia and Turkey—and there would have been no war. But for Lord Aberdeen and his adherents, Palmerston and Russell might have checked the designs and met the overtures of the Czar, by declaring at once that they would not suffer him to send a single soldier across the Pruth, and that if he persisted in his design, they would invite the co-operation of France, and defend Turkey to the uttermost—and in that case also there would have been no war. But the Cabinet was split into two, if not three, parties; and the adoption of a middle course, of feeble dissuasion, unaccompanied by any hint of ulterior consequences, but rather couched in terms of extreme and unworthy subserviency, deceived the Czar, encouraged him to proceed,—and now war is all but declared, and our fleet is riding in the Baltic. We have approached the subject in anything but a party spirit—we have perused the correspondence, recently published, over and over again, in the hope that we might gather from it a justification of the course which the British Ministry has pursued—but we are unable to arrive at any conclusion except this, that but for the