parting with an important item in our revenue. This was another blow levelled against the agricultural interest through the indiscretion of the Government, for it resulted in soap being relieved at the expense of malt. Our discreet Chancellor parts with a quantity of revenue derived from indirect taxation one year, and redeems his blunder the next by levying an increased tax on malt. But what are we to expect from a Chancellor of the Exchequer whose administration of the finances has been one continued system of blunders? The secret lies in this: All his various failings arise from his having entered upon schemes in which, as he proceeded, he soon found himself out of his depth. Another minister would have been deterred from entering upon them, from a sense of the responsibility he would incur. But when a Ministry fancies it contains within itself all the available administrative talent in the Empire, the sense of responsibility is lightened, because opponents are undervalued, and self-confidence augmented. Here, again, do all the other misdemeanours of the Cabinet take their origin. Confident in themselves, and in their fancied influence over Parliament, they bring forward, in the face of war, a larger number of important measures than ever before were introduced to Parliament in the same session. They only exhibited their own weakness. They proved that their plans of legislation differ materially from those of the House of Commons. They discovered that even all the talents cannot blunder with impunity, and they have rapidly sunk in public estimation. Their conduct has disgusted their followers, and provoked a powerful opposition. Their numerous indiscretions would certainly not have been tolerated in any men but our talented rulers in the Coalition; and even they are suffering from the effects of their rashness, but nevertheless seem determined to “survive in office the honour of their administration.” Referring, again, to the Derby Government of 1852, we ask if the Earl of Malmesbury, or any two important members of that Administration, had been afflicted with a like absence of political sagacity to that displayed by Sir James Graham and Sir Charles Wood, where would have been our relations with France? If that Government had, for the sake of the popularity which Sir James Graham values so much, but which no Minister has been so unfortunate in his attempt to gain, joined in the temporary popular resentment against the French Emperor, when would the breach have been healed? But _they_ showed that they understood the interests of the country, and contrast in a favourable light with the members of the Coalition and their misdeeds. They evidently were aware of the deep responsibility under which they lay, and thus their actions were marked with a caution which is not observed by their successors. If Mr Disraeli had not handed over a large balance to his rival, what would have been the effect of the