Supposing that, in the autumn of 1854, an American expedition, starting from Florida, or from one of the small islands in the Bahama channel, made a descent upon Cuba, were entirely worsted, and cut off or compelled to re-embark. How long a time would elapse before a third expedition were got ready? Would not the interval probably be shorter than the one between the Lopez expedition and the present date? The dogged tenacity of a certain class of Americans, when bent upon acquisition, is well known. And is it not probable that each expedition would exceed the preceding one in strength, until one went forth strong enough to triumph? The passage of the island from the feeble hands of bankrupt decrepid Spain into the strong ones of the young and vigorous Union, is a mere question of time, unless other nations interfere. Are any prepared to do so? England and France are of course the only powers to which Spain might look for aid to prevent her being robbed of her last valuable colony. And would she not look to them in vain, at least under present circumstances? I do not believe that the Spaniards reckon on such assistance. The reflecting portion of the nation—those who think upon the subject at all—seem convinced that the island must sooner or later pass from them. Some would be disposed to sell it, whilst it still has value, before the Americans feel so certain of getting it by other means that they will no longer feel disposed to disburse. Others, on the contrary, are for holding it to the last, burning the last cartridge before giving in, and, as a last desperate resource, emancipating the slaves. The most rational and profitable of the two courses would doubtless be the sale. And yet, owing to the ignorance and national conceit of a large number of Spaniards—who believe that the valour of Spanish troops must always suffice to guard Cuba, and who have not sufficient knowledge of the past and present history of the world to see that in the course of nature they must lose it—it would be difficult for any ministry to brave the storm of indignation that would here be raised by the sale of the island. It could, of course, under the present regime, be done only with the sanction of the Cortes; and perhaps the wisest thing the Espartero ministry could do would be to bring forward the subject when that body meets in November. To give advice to Spain is, I am aware, a delicate thing for foreign governments to do, but the men at present at the head of affairs here are not likely to mistake the motive, or to take offence at a well-intended counsel. If England and France be quite decided to take no steps towards the preservation of Cuba to Spain, and if the government of this country be not already perfectly aware of that decision, it would be but right to give it the information, so that it might fairly and fully appreciate its position and chances, and not delude itself with vain hopes, never to be realised, of ultimate succour from powerful allies.