Practically, then, it would seem that political parties in the empire are divided into two classes—one consisting of the Mikado and a large section of the aristocracy, who do not consider themselves bound by treaty-stipulations with foreigners; the other, consisting of the Tycoon and his government, who do; and this latter party, we may conclude, has the sympathy and support of the mass of the population. As, however, the Temporal Government has proved itself too weak to cope with the opposition headed by the Mikado, the question is, how we can best guarantee the safety of our countrymen, and extort that redress which the Government is powerless to enforce in cases of violent outrage. Diplomacy is powerless, for it cannot reach the offenders; and we are thus driven into hostile action. Either we must insist upon the Mikado ratifying the Treaty, and be prepared to employ force in case of his refusing to do so; or we must take summary vengeance upon any individual daimio who offends. The objection to the first course is, that an application to the Mikado for a ratification of the Treaty would imply that it had not been made with the right person in the first instance, and therefore was not valid. We should thus place ourselves in a false position, for which there is no necessity, as the Tycoon’s Government maintain the validity of the Treaty, and deny that any ratification on the part of the Mikado is requisite. On the other hand, there can be no doubt that the recognition of the Treaty by the Mikado would at once put an end to the opposition of the nobles. In the event, moreover, of the Mikado declining to ratify, we should be compelled to use force. And although, as Miako, the residence of the Spiritual Court, is not above thirty miles from the sea, and may be approached for part of the way by a river navigable for gunboats, we could no doubt succeed in any operations we might undertake, we might possibly excite a feeling of hostility towards us, which would not be confined to the feudal class. The chief objection to the second course—that of proceeding against the daimios separately—would be that, if it did not lead to a civil war, the effect of any such retaliation would be a partial and temporary measure. The first course we have suggested is not alluded to by Sir Rutherford, and as the exodus of the daimios had not taken place at the time of the publication of his work, we have not the advantage of knowing our author’s views upon the probable bearing of this important event upon the politics of Japan. After discussing the difficulties attending a policy of conciliation pushed beyond certain limits, and the objections to the alternative of withdrawal, our author goes on to say:—