stating not only the principles and distinctions involved, but the minutest circumstances connected with them, as if the cases had been lying open before him! His very first sentence put an end to all doubt as to the conclusion at which _he_ had arrived. These were his precise words--the last of them uttered with peculiar emphasis:--"My lords, I have to move your lordships that the judgment of the court below in this case be _affirmed_." He proceeded to compliment the judges on the patient and laborious attention and research which they had bestowed upon the case. "My lords," said he, "with respect to all the points submitted to their consideration, with the exception of one question--for in substance it _was_ one question--their opinion and judgment have been unanimous. With reference to that one question, seven of the learned judges, with the Chief-Justice of the Common Pleas at their head, have expressed a distinct, a clear, and decided opinion against the objections which were urged. Two other learned judges have expressed an adverse opinion. I may be permitted to say--and all who were present to hear them must agree with me--that it was an opinion accompanied with much doubt and much hesitation. I think, under these circumstances, that _unless your lordships are thoroughly and entirely satisfied that the opinion of the great majority of the judges was founded in palpable error_, your lordships will feel yourselves, in a case of this kind, bound by their decision to adhere to and support their judgment, and act in conformity with it." After briefly stating the only question before them--viz. "whether, there being defective counts in the indictment, and other counts with defective findings on them, a general judgment can be sustained?"--he proceeded, "Your lordships will observe that this is a mere technical question, though, I admit, of great importance--never presented to the judges of the court below, not calling in question their judgment in substance--but arising entirely out of the manner in which that judgment has been entered up, by those whose province it was to discharge that particular duty." He then made the following decisive and authoritative declaration, which all who know the accurate and profound learning and the vast judicial experience of the Chancellor will know how to value. "Allow me, my lords, to say, that _it has always been considered as a clear, distinct, and undoubted principle of the criminal law of England, that in a case of this nature a general judgment is sufficient_; and from the first moment when I entered the profession, down to the time when I heard the question agitated at your lordships' bar, I never heard it called in question. I have found it uniformly and constantly acted upon, without doubt, without hesitation. I find it in all treatises, in all text-writers on the subject--not questioned, not doubted, not qualified, but stated broadly and clearly. Now for the first time it has been