His lordship, after a luminous commentary on a great number of authorities, thus proceeded--"Now, my lords, it is said that there is _no express decision_ upon the subject. Why, if a case be so clear, so free from doubt, that no man, no attorney, barrister, or judge, ever entertained any scruple concerning it--if the rule have been uniformly acted upon and constantly recognised, is it to be said, that because there is no express decision it is not to be considered _law_? Why, that argument leads to this conclusion--that the more clear a question is, the more free from doubt, the more uncertain it must be! _My lords, what constitutes the law of this country? It is--usage, practice, recognition._ For many established opinions, part of the acknowledged law of the land, you will look in vain for any express decision. I repeat, that practice, usage, recognition, are considered as precedents establishing the law: these are the foundations on which the common law of the country rests; and it is admitted in this case, that the usage is all against the principle now contended for by the plaintiffs in error. No case, no authority of any kind, can be adduced in its favour: it is now admittedly, for the first time, urged in this extraordinary case. And I ask, my lords, if you will not recognise the decision of the great majority of the judges on a question of this kind, involving the technicalities of the law, with which they are constantly conversant? When, on such a point, you find them--speaking by the eminent and able Chief-Justice of the Common Pleas--pronouncing a clear and distinct opinion, it must be a case clear from all doubt--a conviction amounting to actual certainty, upon which alone you would be justified in rejecting such authorities. * * * It is on these grounds, and on the authorities which I have cited, that I assert the universal recognition of the principle which I contend has been acknowledged law from time immemorial." Such was the emphatic, clear, unwavering judgment, deliberately pronounced, after long examination and consideration, by one of the very greatest intellects ever brought to bear upon the science of the law, and of vast judicial experience in the administration of every department of the law--criminal law, common law, and equity.