Lord Denman's judgment (to which great respect is due) was, as far as relates to _the point_ of the case, to this effect:--He had an "unconquerable repugnance" to assuming that the judges had passed sentence on the good counts only; for it was in direct contradiction to _the notorious fact_, that the judges had pronounced certain counts to be good; and it was also against the _common probability_ of every case. He admitted the general opinion of the profession to have long been, that a general judgment, if supported by one sufficient good count, was not injured by a bad one associated with it. "I know," said his lordship,[12] "what course I should have taken if pressed to give judgment at the trial, and had given it. If nothing had taken place respecting the validity of any part of the indictment--but much more if its validity had been disputed, but established--I should leave apportioned the sentence to the degree of criminality that was stated in all the counts which were proved in evidence."--"I see no inconvenience in compelling a judge to form an opinion on the validity of the counts, before he proceeds to pass judgment. He ought to take care that a count is good before he allows a verdict to be taken, or at least judgment to be entered upon it; and great good will arise from that practice. I am deliberately of opinion that this is a right and wholesome practice, producing no inconvenience, and affording a great security for justice. * * * In criminal cases, all difficulty may be entirely avoided by the court passing a separate judgment on each count, and saying, 'We adjudge that on this count, on which the prisoner is found guilty, he ought to suffer so much; that on the second count, having been found guilty, he ought to suffer so much; whether the count turn out to be good or not, we shall pronounce no opinion; that question would be reserved for a superior court. A court of error would then reverse the judgment only on such counts as could not be supported in law--leaving that to stand which had proceeded on valid charges."--"Where a felony was established, requiring a capital punishment, or transportation for life, the number of counts could make no difference; because the punishment pronounced on any one exhausted the whole materials of punishment, and admitted of no addition."--"The current notion, that one count alone could support any sentence applicable to the offences stated in the whole indictment, can be accounted for only by Lord Mansfield's general words, needlessly and inconsiderately uttered, hastily adopted, and applied to a stage of the proceedings in which they are not correct in law." Then came Lord Cottenham--a cold, clear-headed lawyer, cautious, close, and accurate in his reasonings, and very tenacious in adhering to his conclusions: possessing the advantage of several years' judicial experience--as an equity judge. Thus he addressed himself to _the point_ of the case:-- "_Is there error upon the record?_"