_having the sentence in its own hands_, will give judgment 'on the part which is indictable'--and the failure of part of the charge will go only to lessening the punishment. These reasons, however, have plainly no application to _writs of error_; because _a court of error_ CANNOT, _of course, confine the judgment to those parts which are indictable, or lessen it, as the different charges are found to fail_." "The only inconvenience," added his lordship, "which can arise from the rule we are laying down, will be, that the prosecutor must be careful as to the counts on which he means to rely: _the evidence at the trial_ must afford him the means of making the selection--and the defendant has now the means of compelling him to do so." Such was, in substance, Lord Cottenham's judgment. He read it in his usual quiet, homely, matter-of-fact manner, as if he were not at all aware of, or cared not for, the immense importance and public interest attaching to the publication of the conclusion at which he had arrived. Then rose Lord Campbell. In a business-like and satisfactory manner he went briefly over all the points which had been made by the plaintiffs in error, disposing of them all in favour of the crown, (expressing, however, doubts on the subject of the challenge to the array,) till he came to THE POINT--which he thus approached:--"I now come, however, to considerations which induce me, _without hesitation_, humbly to advise your lordships to reverse this judgment." He was brief but pithy in assigning his reasons. "According to the doctrine contended for on the part of the crown," said his lordship, adopting two cases which had been put by, we believe, Mr Peacock in his argument, "the following case may well happen. There may be an indictment containing two counts, A and B, for separate offences; A being a good count, B a bad one. The court below may think A bad and B good; and proceed to sentence the defendant to a heavy punishment merely in respect of B, which, though it may contain in reality not an offence in point of law, they may consider to contain one, and of signal turpitude. On a writ of error, the court above clearly sees that B is a bad count; but cannot reverse the judgment, because there stands count A in the indictment--and which, therefore, (though for a common assault only,) will support the heavy fine and imprisonment _imposed in respect of count B_! Let me suppose another case. An indictment contains two counts: there is a demurrer[13] to each count: each demurrer is overruled, and a general judgment given that the defendant, 'for his offences aforesaid,' shall be fined and imprisoned. Is it to be said, that if he bring a writ of error, and prove one count to be bad, he shall have no relief unless he shows the other to be bad also?"