seriously embarrass the administration of justice! And if too poor to do it, he will, under the operation of the new rule, be suffering punishment unjustly; for the only count selected may be bad, or some one only of several may be bad, and the judgment ought to be reversed. What was the operation of the old rule? Most salutary and decorous. No public account was taken of the innocuous aims, so to speak, taken by justice, in order to hit her victim. If he fell, the public saw that it was in consequence of a blow struck by her, and concerned themselves not with several previous abortive blows. The prisoner, knowing himself _proved_ actually guilty, _and the numerous chances existing against him on the record_, if he chose to make pettifogging experiments upon its technical sufficiency, submitted to his just fate. Let us take one more case--that of _murder_: we fear, that on even such solemn and awful occasions, the new rule will be found to operate most disadvantageously. There are necessarily several, possibly many, counts. Mr Baron Parke[19] admits, that here the old rule should apply; viz. a general judgment of death, which shall not be vitiated by one, or several bad counts, if there be a single good one. The new rule since laid down, says, however, the contrary; that judgment must be reversed for a single bad count. Lord Denman, to meet this difficulty, would pass sentence "upon some one"[20] of them, and thereby exhaust the materials of punishment, and so in effect give a "judgment for one felony." _But how is the record to be dealt with?_ If the prisoner choose to bring a writ of error, and show a single bad count, must not the judgment be reversed if entered generally? And if entered on one count with not guilty on all the others; and that one count proved bad, while even _a single one_ of the rejected counts is good, and would have been supported by the evidence given at the trial, the prisoner can plead _autrefois acquit_ to a fresh indictment, and so get off scot-free, after having been incontestably proved guilty of the act of murder! Suppose then, to avoid so fearful a result, separate sentences of death be passed, to say nothing of the unseemliness of the transaction in open court, which _might_ be avoided: but how can it be avoided _on the record_, upon which it must be entered? Mr Baron Parke pronounces that such a procedure would be "_superfluous, and savour of absurdity_,"[21] and that therefore, "in such a case, the general judgment _might_ be good!" Thus, in order to _work_ the new rule, Mr Baron Parke is forced to make the case of murder a double exception--viz. to the _adoption_ of the new rule at the trial, and then to the _operation_ of the new rule before the court of error, which must then hold that a single bad, or a dozen bad counts, will _not_ vitiate a general judgment, if sustained by one good count! Does not all this suffice to show the desperate shifts