deference to Mr Baron Parke,[26] contain an "offence" which is not "legally described in it;" that is, unless any act charged against the defendant be shown upon the face of the indictment to be a breach of the law, no "_offence_," as regards that act, is contained in or alleged by the indictment. The House of Lords, therefore, has exceeded the narrow province and limited authority of a _court of error_, or has presumed, upon illegal and insufficient grounds, that the Irish judges did not know which were, and which were not "_offences_," and that they did, in fact, consider those to be offences which were not, although the record contains matter to satisfy the allegation to the letter--viz. a _plurality_ of real "offences." Where is Lord Campbell's authority for declaring this judgment "_clearly_ erroneous in awarding punishment for charges which are _not offences in point of law_?" Or Lord Cottenham's, for saying that "the record states that the judgment was _upon all the counts, bad as well as good_?" They have none whatever; their assertions appear to us, with all due deference and respect, purely arbitrary, and gratuitous fallacies; they do violence to legal language--to the language of the record, and foist upon it a ridiculous and false interpretation. We admit, with Lord Cottenham, that "where the sentence is of a nature applicable _only_ to the bad counts," it is incurably vicious, and judgment must be reversed--it is the very case which we put above; but how does that appear in the judgment under consideration? Not at all. The two cases are totally different.