The tactics of Lord Roberts at the capture of Pretoria were badly at fault. The taking of that city was attended by a glaring military blunder unexpected from that great leader. It seemed to be the commander’s only idea to get into the town and to occupy it, rather than to cut off the enemy’s retreat and capture him. The advance was made along the road from Johannesburg, the main force being composed almost entirely of infantry and artillery. The customary flanking movements were commenced. Hutton’s division of mounted infantry swung around one flank for a short distance. French’s cavalry division started around the other flank, but did not get very far before the fighting ceased. It happened that General Botha had not defended Pretoria, and the action that lasted during the entire day of June 4th was merely a rear-guard action, to cover the retirement of the main force. Consequently, no matter what course Lord Roberts might have pursued, he could not have captured more than 1,500 prisoners. But the British commander did not know the state of affairs in Pretoria, and was led to believe that he would be opposed by the concentrated commandoes of General Botha and General de la Rey. Had such been the case his tactics would have allowed the escape of the entire force, as they did allow the slipping away of the rear guard. Had the field marshal delayed the attack of the main body for another day, or even two days, and allowed his mounted troops to get well into the rear, he could have cut off the retreat of the burghers. Instead, his premature frontal attack in force compelled them to retire under the cover of darkness long before their flanks were even threatened.