British Campaigns in Flanders 1690-1794: Being Extracts from "A History of the British Army"Fortescue, J. W. (John William), Sir
History
British Campaigns in Flanders 1690-1794: Being Extracts from "A History of the British Army"
Fortescue, J. W. (John William), Sir
Flanders -- History, Military; Great Britain -- History, Military -- 18th century
It was in such inauspicious circumstances that the representatives of
the various powers met in conference at Antwerp. ◆April 5.◆ Coburg, who
loathed the war and had hoped to end it by an agreement with Dumouriez,
had issued a proclamation declaring himself to be the ally of all
friends of order, and abjuring all projects of conquest in the Emperor’s
name. Instantly Austrians, Prussians, and English with one voice
required him to withdraw it, and to publish a new declaration that he
would prosecute the war vigorously. He did so, but with great
reluctance; indeed, so bitter was his opposition to the new policy that
he tried to open further negotiations with the Convention, and even
furnished it with information which he ought to have kept to
himself.[114] Meanwhile Lord Auckland announced that England, as well as
the other powers, would expect an indemnity for her share in the war;
whereupon the Dutch representative announced that, as every one else was
taking compensation, he hoped that Holland’s claims would not be
forgotten.[115] The sharing of the lion’s skin having thus been
determined, the next thing was to decide upon a plan of operations for
slaying the lion. A vague project was drawn out for the attack of the
frontier-fortresses, in which Coburg reckoned upon the co-operation of
over twenty thousand men, that is to say, of thirteen thousand
Hanoverians and seven thousand five hundred British, in British pay,
besides fifteen thousand Dutch. Dundas was staggered; for he had not yet
the slightest idea what were the ultimate designs of either of the
German powers, who, as he justly complained, were very backward to give
an explicit account of their views either as to the conduct of the war
or the termination of it. “We cannot advise the King,” he wrote, “to
give a blind co-operation to measures not distinctly explained.” But he
hinted that if the Austrians would spare a detachment to help the
British to capture Dunkirk at once, England might make fewer
difficulties about lending her troops for subsequent operations. The
English, he explained, were prejudiced against Continental enterprises;
wherefore it was important to convince the nation early that its troops
in Holland were employed for an object intimately connected with the
interests of Great Britain and the security of her commerce. “The early
capture of Dunkirk by a Prince of the blood,” he added, “would give much
éclat to the commencement of the war.” In other words, Dundas was ready
to employ British troops in the Low Countries only for a political
campaign, and not for the military purposes of the war—to use them, in
fact, primarily to win votes rather than battles. The attitude is but
too characteristic of British Ministers for War.[116]
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account