British Campaigns in Flanders 1690-1794: Being Extracts from "A History of the British Army"Fortescue, J. W. (John William), Sir
History
British Campaigns in Flanders 1690-1794: Being Extracts from "A History of the British Army"
Fortescue, J. W. (John William), Sir
Flanders -- History, Military; Great Britain -- History, Military -- 18th century
thousand troops ready to disembark at once, and had left four ships
behind to bring three thousand more from the army in Roussillon. Full of
gratitude, Hood gave Langara effusive thanks, and appointed Admiral
Gravina, the Spanish officer next senior to Langara, to be commandant of
Toulon.
All this was known to the Government by the 15th of September, by which
time, as shall presently be told, more reassuring news had arrived
from Flanders, to the effect that the French had been checked, and
that Coburg’s army had been liberated for action by the surrender
of Quesnoy. It therefore behoved Ministers seriously to reconsider
their military policy, and to make up their minds definitely whether
their object in the war was to be, as they professed, resistance to
unprovoked aggression and the overthrow of the Convention, or simple
annexation of French possessions. In Flanders their great enterprise,
undertaken with no military knowledge and for no military purpose,
had failed; they were as much as ever in the dark as to the ultimate
designs of Austria, and they could not but be sensible that remarkably
little had been accomplished by the Allies on the Rhine. As a matter
of fact Frederick William, having discovered a glaring instance of
Thugut’s duplicity in the matter of the Bavarian exchange, had at the
end of August practically decided to withdraw from the Coalition. This
was as yet unknown to the British Ministers, for their ambassador at
Vienna, Sir Morton Eden, was completely duped by Thugut; but they were
conscious of an increasing coolness on the part of Prussia towards
the war against the Revolution. In such circumstances, although
the northern frontier of France was, from its proximity, the most
convenient sphere of operations for a British army, they might well
consider the advisability of removing all their forces from that
quarter in order to concentrate them at Toulon, which Lord Hood’s
negotiations had already engaged them to protect. French successes
in the north could be only temporary and unprofitable if the Allies,
by assisting the counter-revolution in the south, should deprive
the Convention of the richest provinces of France. A French force at
Antwerp itself would signify little, if the Allies could rally the
party of order from Bordeaux to Marseilles to put down the tyranny at
Paris.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account