British Campaigns in Flanders 1690-1794: Being Extracts from "A History of the British Army"Fortescue, J. W. (John William), Sir
History
British Campaigns in Flanders 1690-1794: Being Extracts from "A History of the British Army"
Fortescue, J. W. (John William), Sir
Flanders -- History, Military; Great Britain -- History, Military -- 18th century
Such was the composition of the force with which the Duke of York
now undertook, in concert with the Dutch, to protect Holland,
or, in other words, to conduct that most delicate and trying of
operations—manœuvring with inferior numbers over a wide front to hold
a superior force in check. The first difficulty arose with the Dutch,
for the Prince of Orange, apparently enamoured of the Austrian methods,
was eager to scatter the troops over a multitude of different points;
but this the Duke, with Craig at his back, steadily refused to do. The
Prince then urged that the Dutch fortresses should be garrisoned by
British troops; but the said fortresses were all in bad condition, and
were repairing only with that incredible slowness which was peculiar
to the Dutch Government. The Duke, therefore, refused this also;
feeling tolerably sure that, if he consented, his battalions would
be sacrificed piecemeal for the defence of Holland, while the Dutch
looked on without raising a man to help them. The two gates of Holland
on the south were Bergen-op-Zoom and Breda, and on the east Grave and
Nimeguen, with the fortress of Bois-le-Duc midway between Breda and
Nimeguen. The two eastern gates were safe so long as the Austrians
retained Maastricht and their position on the Meuse; but the Austrians
were not to be trusted. Accordingly, the Duke resolved to garrison
Breda, Bergen-op-Zoom, and, if possible, Bois-le-Duc with Dutch troops;
himself taking up a position on the north bank of the river Aa, with
his right resting on Bois-le-Duc and his left on the great morass
called the Peel. From this central point he judged that he could move
to the help of any of the Dutch fortresses to southward, cover the
province of Gelderland, and keep Grave and Nimeguen within reach in
case of mishap on that side.
He was about to march thither from Rozendahl when the news came that
Moreau, who was advancing northward along the coast after the capture of
Nieuport, had driven back the Dutch posts and had besieged Sluys. The
Prince of Orange thereupon besought the Duke to stand fast, producing a
letter from Coburg which contained not only an assurance of his ability
to hold the passage of the Meuse, but even a hint of possible offensive
movements. After some hesitation the Duke consented to a compromise by
moving to Osterhout, a little to the north-east of Breda, so as to give
some countenance both to Breda and Bergen-op-Zoom. ◆July 31.◆ He
marched, accordingly, on the 31st of July, unmolested by the enemy, who
were in force around Antwerp; and the Prince of Orange then came to the
wise but rather belated decision to evacuate all the Dutch fortresses to
the south of the Scheldt. ◆Aug. 8.◆ The Duke, therefore, lent him a
strong detachment of his men to hold the communications between Breda
and Bergen-op-Zoom, so as to release Dutch troops to cover the retreat
of these garrisons and to relieve Sluys.[272]
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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