British Campaigns in Flanders 1690-1794: Being Extracts from "A History of the British Army"Fortescue, J. W. (John William), Sir
History
British Campaigns in Flanders 1690-1794: Being Extracts from "A History of the British Army"
Fortescue, J. W. (John William), Sir
Flanders -- History, Military; Great Britain -- History, Military -- 18th century
Their losses in the action were terribly severe. Of the fifteen
thousand infantry, English and Hanoverian, for the Hanoverians bore
themselves not less nobly than their Allies, nearly six thousand were
killed or wounded, the casualties of the twenty English battalions just
exceeding four thousand men. The heaviest sufferers were the Twelfth
and Twenty-third regiments, both of which lost over three hundred men,
the Twenty-first and Thirty-first, which lost rather fewer than three
hundred men apiece, and the three battalions of Guards, which lost
each of them about two hundred and fifty. Of the Generals of Foot,
Cumberland, Ligonier, and Brigadier Skelton, though in the hottest of
the fire, alone came off unhurt; all of the rest were either killed
or wounded. Many regiments of cavalry also suffered not a little, in
particular the Blues and Royal Dragoons; and the total loss of the
British cavalry exceeded three hundred men and six hundred horses. The
loss of the French was never made public, but was certainly at least
equal to that of the Allies. Contemporary accounts set it down, with no
great improbability, at fully ten thousand men. As an example of the
prowess of British infantry, Fontenoy stands almost without a parallel
in its history. The battalions formed under a cross-fire of artillery,
remained halted under the same fire, advanced slowly for half a
mile in perfect order under the same fire, and marched up to within
pistol-shot of the French infantry to receive their volley before they
discharged a shot. They shattered the French battalions to pieces,
repulsed three separate attacks of cavalry, halted under a heavy
cannonade, retired for some distance and re-formed under a cross-fire,
advanced again with both artillery and musketry playing on front and
flanks, made the bravest brigade in the French service recoil, repelled
another desperate attack of cavalry, and retired slowly and orderly
under a cross-fire almost to the end. By consent of all the British
commanders it was Ingoldsby’s misunderstanding of his orders and his
failure to capture the Redoubt d’Eu that lost the battle; and Ingoldsby
was duly tried by court-martial for his behaviour. He was, however,
acquitted of all but an error in judgment; and indeed there was no
question of cowardice, for he accompanied the remainder of the infantry
in its advance with his own detachment and was severely wounded. It is
customary to blame Cumberland for dashing his head against a wall in
attempting such an attack; and no doubt he was guilty of a tactical
blunder in assaulting a re-entrant angle before the salient had been
carried. But he could hardly have been expected to count on such bad
luck as the failure of Ingoldsby on one flank and of the Dutch on
the other. The sheer audacity of his advance went near to give him
the victory. Saxe owned that he never dreamed that any General would
attempt such a stroke, or that any troops would execute it. Cumberland
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account