Browning and Dogma: Seven Lectures on Browning's Attitude Towards Dogmatic ReligionNaish, Ethel M.
Religion
Browning and Dogma: Seven Lectures on Browning's Attitude Towards Dogmatic Religion
Naish, Ethel M.
Browning, Robert, 1812-1889 -- Religion
Again could it be deemed a token of the divine Wisdom that
Becoming wise meant making slow and sure advance
From a knowledge proved in error to acknowledged ignorance?
(ll. 339-340.)
Finally, seeing that Power must within itself include the force known as
Will, could that indeed rank as omnipotence, which was incapable of
securing for man even the enjoyment of life possessed by the worm which,
on the hypothesis of the non-existence of a future world, becomes "man's
fellow-creature," man too being thus but the creature of an hour? Since
with the loss of his immortal destiny passes also the reason (according to
Browning's reiterated theory) of his imperfection as compared with the
more complete physical perfection of the lower world of animal life. If,
then, such a consummation is the sole outcome of the Creator's work the
conclusion is inevitable, that the Goodness, Wisdom, and Power ascribed to
Him must be limited in range and capacity. Thus again the premise
originally accepted as a basis of argument has to be rejected--a God
possessing merely human attributes is no God. But once more also, though
in stronger terms, the conclusion of ll. 242-243:
Only grant a second life, I acquiesce
In this present life as failure, count misfortune's worst assaults
Triumph, not defeat, assured that loss so much the more exalts
Gain about to be. (ll. 358-361.)
Thus all experience fairly considered goes to prove the necessity for a
future life; and with the hope of such a future is closely interwoven the
need also for reunion with those who have already tested the grounds of
their belief:
Grant me (once again) assurance we shall each meet each some day.
* * * * *
Worst were best, defeat were triumph utter loss were utmost gain.
(ll. 387-389.)
_B._ Nevertheless, the soul refuses even yet to accept, without that which
it deems reasonable proof, the justice of its intuitions and of its hopes
arising from experience. It will assume the position of arbitrator in the
debate which it permits between the sometime opposing forces of Reason and
Fancy, as to the results of an acceptance of that belief, for an assurance
of the truth of which it yearns.
_Fancy._ To the facts already admitted as the basis of argument Fancy may,
therefore, add a third, "that after body dies soul lives again."
_Reason._ In accepting the challenge to employ these three facts--God, the
soul, a future life--in a rational development of the present phase of
existence, Reason would reply that deductions from experience suggest that
the future life must necessarily prove an advance on the old. This being
so, the most prudent course is obviously that which would take, without
delay, the step leading from the lower to the higher; always allowing that
there is no existent law restrictive of man's free will in this matter.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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