In this passage of _La Saisiaz_ recurs also that suggestion so characteristic of Browning--introduced dramatically in _Easter Day_, to be met with again later in the expositions nominally ascribed to Ferishtah--the theory of the adaptation of the entire universe, as known to man, to the needs and development of the individual soul. As in _Easter Day_ is depicted by the Vision the work of Absolute omnipotence, Able its judgments to dispense To the whole race, as every one Were its sole object; (_E. D._, ll. 662-665.) so again in _A Camel-driver_ is emphasized the individual character of the final Judgment: Thou and God exist-- So think!--for certain: think the mass--mankind-- Disparts, disperses, leaves thyself alone! Ask thy lone soul what laws are plain to thee,-- Thee and no other,--stand or fall by them! That is the part for thee: _regard all else For what it may be--Time's illusion_. Similarly here the entire scheme of life is to be regarded from the individual standpoint; all outside the "narrow hem" of personal experience can be but the result of surmise. Therefore Solve the problem: "From thine apprehended scheme of things, deduce Praise or blame of its contriver, shown a niggard or profuse In each good or evil issue! nor miscalculate alike Counting one the other in the final balance, which to strike, Soul was born and life allotted: ay, the show of things unfurled For thy summing-up and judgment,--thine, no other mortal's world!" (ll. 287-292.) With the acceptance, however, of the doctrine, "His own world for every mortal," recurs again the disturbing reflection inevitable to the contemplation of that world whether in its personal relation, or as a training-ground for "some other mortal." Were the extreme transitoriness and the preponderance of pain indispensable factors in the scheme of instruction? Can we love but on condition, that the thing we love must die? Needs then groan a world in anguish just to teach us sympathy? (ll. 311-312.) Certainly personal experience has resulted in the conclusion: Howsoever came my fate, Sorrow did and joy did nowise,--life well weighed,--preponderate! (ll. 333-334.) In the discussion which follows (ll. 335-348) the fact of the existence of these evils is employed to enforce the admission of the necessity of a future life. It is in fact the earlier argument (ll. 235, _et seq._) repeated and elaborated. How are the existing conditions of life to be reconciled with the belief in the over-ruling Providence of a God whose name is synonymous with goodness, wisdom, and power? Here each attribute is dealt with categorically--Was it proof of the divine Goodness that within the limits of the poet's personal experience The good within [his] range Or had evil in admixture or grew evil's self by change? (ll. 337-338.)