Then arises the further question. If, indeed, Setebos is the author of the visible creation, what has been the motive instigating him to the work? In accordance with Caliban's experience of his own nature, it is impossible that any motive other than self-interest in some form or another should have actuated the Creator: hence he attributes the design to the discomfort of the dwelling-place "in the cold o' the moon." Nevertheless, even after the creation of the sun its warmth proved insufficient for comfort, the god failed to enjoy "the air he was not born to breathe." Again, in the constitution of the animate beings inhabiting the island he strove to realize (so says Caliban) "what himself would fain in a manner be." Hence the creatures made by Setebos are "weaker in most points" than is the god himself, yet "stronger in a few." A theory suggesting an interesting comparison with the arguments by which David in _Saul_ deduces the necessity of an Incarnation. Caliban ascribes to Setebos the power of originating faculties which he does not himself possess, and which in the nature of things he might, therefore, be deemed incapable of realizing. The illustration or comparison offered is that of Caliban's own imagined occupation in an idle moment, when the idea occurs to him to make a bird of clay, endowing it with the power of flight, a power not numbered amongst his own capabilities. Thus he holds that Setebos, too, may create living beings, bestowing upon them faculties which he is himself incapable of exercising, making them, though, "weaker in some points, stronger in a few." To the more cultivated intelligence of the Hebrew psalmist, as represented by Browning, such theory is untenable. That "the creature [should] surpass the Creator--the end what Began"[10] is as incomprehensible as it is illogical. Love existent in the creature is to David proof sufficient of the existence of love in the Creator. So thinks not Caliban. And yet with the curious inconsistency marking the reasoning of the slowly developing intellect, Setebos is represented as mocking his creatures whilst envying the capabilities with which he has gifted them. Thus: So brave, so better though they be, It nothing skills if He begins to plague. (ll. 66, 67.) As the creation has been the result of mere wantonness, so the recognition of all appeal from created beings to the Creator will be governed by the same caprice. As with Caliban's imagined dealings with his clay bird, he would do good or ill accordingly As the chance were this might take or else Not take my fancy. (ll. 90-91.) So also is the action of the Deity towards his creation in all relations of life. He has elected Prospero for a career of "knowledge and power," and, as his servant judges, one of supreme comfort, whilst he has appointed Caliban, equally deserving--in his own estimation--to hold the position of slave.