One reads of this in the colossal thought-symphony of the Brahmajāla Sutta of the _Dīgha Nikāya_. It is thus that a spirit speaks who has burst through the barriers of self-imposed conceptions and unimpeded launches out into the infinitudes where thought finds never a bound save that itself enjoins, nor any halt save that it sets itself. In conclusion I recapitulate:-- Like all the other problems of science, this too is of a dialectical nature. One is operating with one identity “world” and another identity “life,” and afterwards strives in vain to bring the two into comprehensible association. In the simple entertaining of such ideas one has cut oneself off from every possibility of a solution. There is no identity “world,” no identity “life.” There are nothing but self-sustaining, _i.e._ beginningless processes which here and there group themselves into systems of worlds. If one has comprehended the whole world as Sankhāra, there is no cosmological problem. World and life are there as the beginningless unity of “processioning.” As a working hypothesis, what service is here rendered by the Buddha-thought? The Buddha-thought explains how it comes to seem as if life had a first beginning upon a world. For as a matter of fact there is such a first beginning, and it permits of being proven historically and geologically. All this is beyond possibility of dispute: it is only the interpretation that is mistaken. This first beginning is such, much in the same way that the spring welling from the rock is the first beginning of the river. It is the first beginning only where one objectifies the river as an identity. If science seeks to explain the first beginning of life by spontaneous generation, she resembles a man who should derive the spring from the rock itself. If she seeks to derive the first beginning of life from other worlds, she then is like a man who would fain derive the spring as such, as an abstract objectified something, from one or another of various localities. Only in the Buddha-thought is the first beginning of life conceived of in a genuinely cosmogonical manner, as form of the play of world-events. It is no migration of duly shaped and formed “spring”-elements, which out of atmospherical vapour and the waters of the sea fashion a spring, but a self-displacement of centres of energy. In the selfsame way it is no migration of life-elements hither out of other worlds, but a self-displacement of centres of energy, which makes it that life “sprouts” anew upon a world. Here, to speak about a first beginning as such, and consequently of a condition of greater or lesser development, has about as much meaning as if one should speak of a condition of greater or lesser development in the case of the waters of the ocean, the vapour of the atmosphere, the fountain on the hill. What is true with reference to science’s problem of heredity is even more true of her cosmological problem: it is wholly Hebraic.