3. That position formulated by Kant with his “thing in itself,” which may be briefly characterized as a position of the most resolute indifference towards this most important of all epistemological phenomena. When in his _History of Materialism_, Lange, in agreement with Kant, says: “What right have we to occupy ourselves with ‘things in themselves’ at all?” this simply means, “What right have we to think at all?” By this stroke, which Kant carried out by the formulation of his “thing in itself,” he has proved himself one of the most hurtful of all noxious creatures found on the tree of the mental life of humanity. Here he has done as much harm as scholastic obtuseness only can do when it steps forth in the polished, mirror-clear armour of a complete logic. But this is not the place to enter any further into that matter. Upon all these three possibilities the Buddha sheds a simultaneous flood of light, illuminating sceptical criticism especially, in the most exceptional manner. This latter proves in entirely incontestable fashion that a _substans_ seated at the root of things has no existence, yet all its proving possesses not the slightest conclusiveness. Hume, with all his acuteness, falls completely under that paradigm given by R. Avenarius in his _Kritik der reinen Erfahrung_, where a savage contends with a missionary as to whether or no a spirit inhabits in all things. The (unbelieving) missionary is made to say, “I have investigated all these things and never anywhere have I found the spirit.” To which the savage counters, “I have investigated them all too, and never anywhere have I failed to find the spirit.” Indeed, this example admits of being extended thus far in that the savage must feel himself reinforced in his notion of an immaterial _substans_ by the very fact that the other, despite all his search, has found nothing. He would say, “Just _because_ you have found nothing, therefore I am right!” Like the two opposing views of the world, criticism also operates with a contradiction of itself. To be consistent, the criticism of Hume, as every criticism, ought to run somewhat as follows:-- “A _substans_ in things is not demonstrable; these present themselves to me only as a bundle of relation-values. If there is no _substans_ in things, how comes it that the idea of a _substans_ finds a place in me? Through experience? That, here, were a contradiction in itself; for this idea exists in me, the critic, only in so far as I deny its existence. Consequently there must be something given in me which supplies the foundation for this idea. But I can unravel myself also, to the very last thread and here, too, find nothing but a bundle of relation-values. The one thing in this bundle which I cannot embrace in my comprehension, is this my own capacity of unravelling myself, _i.e._ my consciousness. On this, consequently, I must in fairness withhold myself from passing any judgment.”