With this, thought would have so prepared itself--so far as such a thing is possible from its own resources--as to be able to take up and work out the Buddha-thought as inciting impulsion. From this point the Buddha-teaching, put briefly, would continue:-- All human thinking, without exception, operates with the concept of a _substans_ lying at the root of things. Thou also, the critic, must conform thyself to the rule. It is a _necessity of thought_. The ground of this is, that in point of fact a _substans_ does lurk in things; not as a “constant in itself,” however,--such a thing, to be sure, thou canst through thy rigid analysis exclude--but solely as _that which gives the continuity of the process_, its maintenance, as an _actual_ law of formation. This law of formation _becomes_ accessible to thee, the individual, in consciousness. To see into that, however, thou must be taught. So long as that does not come to pass, it is a matter of taste or of natural inclination as to whether thou wilt interpret the facts accessible to sense as significant of _substans_, or of the absence of _substans_. For in the facts themselves there lies nothing that impels either in the one direction or the other. The decision lies solely with that unique something _by means of which_ you bring all these facts before yourself--namely, with consciousness. To bring this itself before you, however, as a “fact,” this is as impossible as that any one should be able to bring his back before him though he should turn himself about never so swiftly and dexterously. To comprehend this unique something--for this, instruction is needed; and following upon this instruction, _growing insight_ (intuition). If, however, thou wilt permit thyself to be instructed, then shalt thou learn that both these thought-necessities--that of adequate cause as that of _substans_--here merge into one. _The idea of “substans”_ here becomes a form of the law of adequate cause. Both necessities of thought--that of adequate cause and that of _substans_--merge and blend into one in the Kamma teaching of the Buddha. With this the circle is closed; the end interlocks with the beginning. We have discharged our self-imposed task of assigning the Buddha-thought its place in the life of the mind. Nothing has been said touching the problem of the freedom of the will, nor on the problem of deity which involves that of immortality. The former of these is the problem of morality; the latter, the problem of religion. Their due place is in the successor to this volume. CONCLUSION It is clear, without further need of demonstration, that with the Kamma teaching of the Buddha there is given the ferment of an actual morality as of an actual religion. A morality and a religion are _actual_ when they are functions of cognition. All morality rests upon selflessness. If selflessness is not to be blind asceticism or equally blind training, it must have a motive.