That there is here no thought of consciousness as “something in itself,” as soul, as an identity, is made abundantly clear in the following passage:-- A monk named Sati, as the outcome of his own cogitations, arrives at the conclusion that “consciousness” is something that in the progress of re-births passes over as _anaññaŋ_, as “not-other”--that is, as an identity, as a spiritual substance. He is reprimanded by the Buddha in these words: “Have not I in many and diverse ways expounded consciousness as something arising always in dependence upon somewhat? Without adequate cause there is no coming to be of consciousness.”[7] To much the same effect runs a passage in the _Visuddhi Magga_:-- “But it is to be understood that this latter consciousness (that of the new existence is meant) did not come to the present existence from the previous one, and also that it is only to causes contained in the old existence that its present appearance is due.”[8] Only when one understands that _Viññāṇa_ (consciousness) is Kamma itself, does a “consciousness” that passes over from existence to existence become divested of its seeming senselessness. When, for example, I say, “The American heat-wave has passed over to Europe,” this does not mean that an absolutely definite something called “heat-wave” has set out on a journey. It only means that certain pulses of energy which manifest themselves to sense under the form of a wave of heat are making their presence known in a new locality. In just the same way, when I say, “Consciousness passes over from one existence to another,” this does not mean that an absolutely definite something called “consciousness” goes forth upon its travels, but that the pulse of energy of the _I_-process which, wherever it is present at all _as such_ manifests itself as consciousness, makes its presence known in a new location. Should any one insist upon conceiving of the heat-wave as a something travelling, he would rightly become the butt of ridicule. In similar wise, the scholars of the west with their profound researches into this “consciousness” that passes over from existence to existence, make fair marks for jest and laughter. Here, of course, they are only working further along in the tracks of physiology and biology, both of which so long as they seek for a “seat” of consciousness, labour under a like tragi-comic misconception. No good purpose is to be served by instancing here in detail all the crass misconceptions of which our western scholars are guilty in the interpretation of this point. That would only be to burden this book on its way with quite unnecessary ballast. Wherever the reader meets with such misconceptions, he can correct them for himself on the lines of the foregoing explanations. In passing, however, it may be mentioned that he will meet with such misconceptions in pretty nearly every book about Buddhism. And now we stand confronted by the question:--