necessarily be indivisible, since if it were divisible it would no longer be the smallest atom possible, which would be contrary to the supposition. It therefore seems to me, that every hypothesis where a progress, _ad infinitum_, is admitted, ought to be rejected not only as false, but as void of all probability; and as the system of eggs and spermatic worms supposes this progress, they should not be admitted in philosophy. Another great difficulty against these two systems is, that in the egg system the first woman contained the male and female eggs: the male eggs contained only a generation of males; and that, on the contrary, the female eggs contained thousands of generations, both of males and females; insomuch that, at the same time, and in the same woman, there was always a certain number of eggs capable of developing themselves to infinity, and another number which would be unfolded but once. The same circumstance must occur in the other system, and therefore I ask if there is the smallest appearance of probability in these suppositions? A third difficulty arises against these two systems, which is, the resemblance that children bear, sometimes to the father and sometimes to the mother, and sometimes to both; and the evident marks of extraordinary difference in mules, &c. If from the spermatic worm of the father the foetus is produced, how can the child resemble the mother; and if the foetus is pre-existing in the egg of the mother, how can the child resemble its father? or if the spermatic worm of a horse, or the egg of a she-ass contains the foetus, how can the mule participate in the nature and figure of both the horse and the ass? These general difficulties, which are invincible, are not the only ones that can be made against these systems; there are particular ones which are no less potent. To begin with the system of spermatic worms, may it not be asked of those who admit of it, how they think this transformation is made? and object to them, that insects have not, nor cannot have any relation with what they suppose. For the worm which is to become a fly, or the caterpillar which is to become a butterfly, passes through a middle state, and when it ceases to be a chrysalis, it is completely formed and has acquired its full size, and is then in a condition of engendering; whereas in the pretended transformation of the spermatic worm into man, it cannot be said to be in a state of chrysalis, and even if we should suppose one during the first days of conception, why does not the production of this chrysalis, instead of an unformed embryo, suppose an adult and perfect being? We plainly see how analogy is here violated; and that far from confirming this idea of the transformation of the spermatic worm, it is instantly destroyed by examination.