From the 1st to the 5th constant sallies were made under able commanders, and many of the posts regained from the enemy. The Burmese showed no want of activity, yet, as a recent writer observes, “little harm was effected by this show of activity; but as the Burman force could no longer be permitted to harass the troops with impunity, and it was not impossible for them to escape from the consequences of a defeat, the commander-in-chief resolved to become the assailant, and terminate the expectations in which they had hitherto been permitted to indulge.”[304] Now, at length, had the time arrived when the primary intentions of the general might be carried out,—now, indeed, was that grand, resistless march to begin which finds no parallel in the history of any nation of modern times save our own. Sallies were continually made,—the men spared no nerve,—the officers no thought,—all was bent upon the grand idea of driving the enemy’s vast army back into me heart of the land whence it had come. First, the Burmese posts at Puzendown were taken _au point de l’épée_ by Majors Sale and Walker, the latter of whom fell during the contest,—then the division at Dalla was routed by Lieut.-Colonel Farrier and Lieut.-Colonel Parlby. Maha Bundoola himself began to be afraid of the redoubtable “foreigners,” and retired from the active direction of the battle-field, giving up the executive command to Maha Thilwa, formerly governor of Asam, who stockaded his troops four miles to the north at Kokein. Emissaries were now set at work to destroy Rangoon by fire, and half of it was burnt, including the official quarter of the Madras commissariat. It became necessary to dislodge this body, and it was accordingly done under the direction of General Campbell. In fifteen minutes the strong stockades were in the possession of the British, and thus fifteen hundred determined men put to the rout twenty thousand—for such, it appeared, was the enemy’s force—with only the loss of eighteen killed, though many were wounded. During these engagements the greatest terror was excited by the _Diana_ steam-packet, by the aid of which many war-boats were captured. “The Burmans,” concludes Wilson, “no longer dared attempt offensive operations, but restricted themselves to the defence of their positions along the river; and the road was now open to the British army, which, agreeably to the policy that had been enjoined by the events of the war, prepared to dictate the terms of peace, if necessary, within the walls of the capital.”[305]