therefore, altogether more consistent to consider that, in the order of cause and effect, the exercise of the Divine attributes is consequent upon their existence; and that the plan of the Almighty is the result of his infinite knowledge; and that the decrees of his throne flow forth from the eternal fountain of his wisdom. This idea, moreover, accords with the Scriptures:--"For whom he did foreknow, he also did predestinate to be conformed to the image of his Son." "Elect according to the foreknowledge of God the Father." In these passages predestination and the decree of election are most clearly founded on foreknowledge. This, therefore, must settle the question: God foreknows in order to predestinate; but he does not predestinate in order to foreknow.[2] But foreknowledge is pressed into this argument in another form. "The foreknowledge of God," it is said, "is tantamount to a decree; because, inasmuch as God cannot be in a mistake, whatever he foreknows must take place--his knowledge makes it certain." This is indeed shifting the argument; for if God's knowledge makes an event certain, of course it is not his predetermination. But, according to this notion, every thing contained in the idea of predestination is implied in foreknowledge, which is only throwing the subject back on the ground first glanced at, that knowledge and decree are both one, which is obviously absurd. Beside, such an idea would make the scriptures that represent God's foreknowledge as distinct from his decree and antecedent to it, worse than unmeaning: "Whom he did foreknow, them he did predestinate," would mean, "whom he did predestinate, them he did predestinate"--and, "Elect according to the foreknowledge of God," would only mean, "that the decree of election was _according_ to the decree of election!" the absurdity of which is too apparent to need comment. And it may be urged, farther, in reply to this argument, that knowledge or foreknowledge cannot, in the nature of things, have the least possible influence in making an event certain. It is not at all difficult to conceive how the certainty of an event can beget knowledge; but if any one thinks that knowledge is the cause of certainty, let him show it--to me such a connection is inconceivable. Whatever God foreknows or foresees, will undoubtedly come to pass. But the simple question is, Does the event take place because it is foreknown, or is it foreknown because it will take place? Or, in other words, Does God know an event to be certain because it is certain, or does his knowing it to be certain make it certain? The question thus stated, at once suggests the true answer; for he would be considered a fool or a madman who should seriously assert that a knowledge of a certainty produced that certainty. According to that, a certainty must exist in order to be foreknown; and it must be foreknown in order to exist! From all which it appears that foreknowledge can have no influence in making a future event certain.