On the night of September 20th, 1916, the First Battalion moved up from support to the firing-line, beyond the ruins of the above-mentioned little hamlet. For the past few days it had rained incessantly, and all ranks had been working night and day, in mud and slush, carrying material of all kinds to the front line. The men were soaked to the skin, caked with mud, and very weary, but they went “up-along” with an amazing cheeriness, for rumour had whispered that the regiment was to attack, and the men were in that frame of mind when the prospect of “getting their own back” appealed to them hugely. Although the enemy opened up an intense barrage during the relief, casualties were comparatively few, and by morning the First Battalion was, Micawber-like, “waiting for something to turn up.” Three companies, “A,” “B,” and “D,” held the front line, with “C” Company in close support. The positions were to the east of Courcelette, opposite a maze of German trenches which constituted a thorn in the side of the Corps and Army Commanders, and which had for several days checked the advance and were therefore a serious menace to future plans. Just how great was the necessity to capture this highly organised and strongly manned defensive system may be gauged by the letter received by the Commanding Officer from the Divisional Commander on the eve of the attack. In it the G.O.C. expressed his confidence in the ability of “The Good Old First” to capture the position, and to hold it, and he added that it _must_ be taken at all costs--“if the first attack fails, you must make a second.” On the capture of this strong point hung the fate of other operations on the grand scale. It was the key position, and it fell to the First Canadian Battalion to be honoured with the task of taking it. Until two and a half hours previous to the attack (when the Operation Order had been issued, and final instructions given), the latest _maps_ of the German defences had been all the C.O. and his staff could work upon. Then, truly at the eleventh hour, an aerial _photograph_, taken but twenty-four hours before, was sent to Bn. Head-quarters with the least possible delay. This showed such increase in the enemy defences, and trenches in so much better shape to withstand attack, that the whole tactical situation was changed, and it became necessary not only to alter the operation order completely, but also to draw a map, showing the most recent German lines of defence. This was done.