Alba Regalis had been in the hands of the Turks for thirty years, and during that time had become virtually a Moslem city. Turkish mosques, palaces and market place had been constructed in it and its fortifications had been strengthened until the place was well-nigh impregnable. The Turks had come to consider Alba Regalis a permanent possession and its fall was a great blow to their pride as well as a serious setback in their military operations. As soon as the Sultan was informed of the Duc de Mercœur’s advance against the stronghold, he hastily raised a force of sixty thousand men and sent it to the relief, under Hassan Pasha, the commander-in-chief of the Turkish army. Hassan had pushed forward with all possible expedition but, as we know, Alba Regalis fell whilst he was still a considerable distance away. This did not check the advance of the Turkish general. On the contrary it induced him to hurry on in the hope of arriving before the Christians should have time to repair the breaches in the walls and other damages to the defences which their assault must, as he naturally supposed, have made. Thanks, however, to Captain John Smith’s stratagem, as we should now call him, the artillery had been comparatively little used in the reduction of the city and a few days sufficed to put it in its former condition, so far as the outworks were concerned. Scouts kept a close watch on the Turkish army and reported to the Duc that it was strung out to such an extent that the last regiments were a full day’s march behind the vanguard. This fact suggested to Mercœur the bold expedient of going out to meet the enemy instead of awaiting him behind the walls of Alba Regalis. The plan was based on logical reasoning and had the approval of Meldritch and other leaders. The Turks would not expect such a move and would continue their advance in single column of regiments. The Christians would thus have the advantage of numbers on their side in the early part of the engagement and the enemy could hardly bring more than two to one against them before the close of the first day. If advisable the defenders of the city might retire within the walls at nightfall. The force of Hassan Pasha was largely composed of raw levies, undisciplined and inexperienced, who would necessarily be worn in consequence of the forced marches to which they had been subjected. Furthermore, the Duc was too keen a soldier to allow thirty thousand men to be shut up in a beleaguered town for months when their services were so urgently needed elsewhere. These considerations then prompted him to a decision which proved to have been an eminently wise one.