Carranza, Venustiano, 1859-1920; Mexico -- History -- Revolution, 1910-1920; Mexico -- Politics and government -- 1910-1946
Two days after the landing of the marines General Navarrete of the
staff of General Maas passed through the American lines into the fort
of Ulloa, where he tried to induce F. Iglesias Calderón to join Huerta
in Mexico City and publish a manifesto uniting all factions against the
hated Americans.
Don Fernando Iglesias answered that he could not believe any
promises made by Huerta and that he was quite certain that the
Constitutionalists would not join the dictator even if they were
forced to resist an American invasion in the north. A few days later
the Commander of the fort under the advice of Don Fernando Iglesias
released all the political prisoners.
The Vera Cruz incident showed up the Federals as a despicable, cowardly
lot,--they had to arm a few hundred ex-convicts and civilians to do the
fighting for them.
The retirement of the Federals to Soledad likewise proved that there
was no serious intention to resist an advance of American soldiers to
Mexico City, as the general line of march could never have been taken
by way of Soledad, but only through the Cerro Gordo on the road to
Jalapa by the Interoceanic Railroad, the same itinerary used by Scott
in 1847. By advancing through the Cerro Gordo, Jalapa, Perote and
Puebla, the American troops could have ignored or driven the Federals
at Soledad into the mountains and by the capture of Esperanza cut off
their communications in the rear. That would automatically have forced
them to evacuate Soledad, Cordoba, and Orizaba. The whole campaign
would have been a repetition of the treachery of Santa Anna in 1847.
Fortunately for the Americans and Mexicans, President Wilson was too
wise to fall into such a trap, and the Constitutionalists were too
patriotic to play into the hands of Huerta.
NOTE.--The details about the arming of prisoners in Ulloa and the
landing of American marines in Vera Cruz were given to the writer by
Don Fernando Iglesias Calderón.
CHAPTER VI
THE FINANCIAL ORGANIZATION OF THE REVOLUTION
Interested observers among the Americans and foreigners were wondering
how the Constitutionalists could keep up a revolution against an
organized military dictatorship like Huerta which had millions at
its disposal; and strange to relate instead of getting weaker the
revolutionists grew stronger and better organized; they seemed to have
money to buy arms and ammunition, to run their local governments and
even to send representatives to the United States, and Paris, London,
Madrid and Barcelona, as well as social and political investigators
into America and Europe. The Huerta Government was as surprised as
the foreigners; they were certain that after a year of fighting, the
backbone of the revolution would be broken, but instead, the offensive
became so dangerous that General Huerta invited American intervention
so as to save himself as well as his partisans from complete political
annihilation.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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