In a pamphlet of recent date there will be found the decrees and other transactions of the Constitutionalist army. The official publication born in Chihuahua, 1914, prints the date of each one of the decrees permitting the printing of paper money. The first issue of paper money was emitted for 5,000,000 pesos on the 26th of April, 1913, the second one for fifteen millions on February 28th, 1913, and the third one for ten millions on February 12th, 1914, for bills of five, ten, fifty and hundred pesos denominations. As the circulation of those three issues tended to raise prices in general by paralyzing the transactions with fractional money, Carranza authorized three more issues of paper money. One for two hundred thousand, the second for eight hundred thousand and the third for one million, for five and ten cents denominations, on the 26th of April, 28th of December, 1913, and on February 12th, 1914. Up to May, 1914, altogether thirty-two million pesos in paper money were issued to cover the expenses of the revolution. The governors and military chiefs were empowered to do the same in the States under their jurisdiction: Generals Villa and Chao in the State of Chihuahua, Governor Riveros in Sinaloa, General Caballeros in Tamaulipas and Villareal in Nuevo Leon. When it is considered that the Constitutionalists had almost 100,000 men under arms, the Madero revolution by comparison will seem an amateurish and insignificant affair. General Obregon was supposed to have 20,000, General Villa another 20,000, General Gonzalez 22,000, General Carrera 20,000, General Natera and the Arrietas 6,000, without counting the Zapatistas with over 20,000 men. On an average and in fairly round figures the revolution cost about $200,000 a week or $800,000 a month. For a revolution which has lasted over a year and three months the performance is quite wonderful and shows remarkable organizing qualities in Carranza and the amazing vitality of Mexico. When General Huerta waded through Madero’s blood into the dictator’s chair he was able to get over fifty million dollars in gold from American and French bankers, besides voluntary and enforced contributions from the Catholic clergy, foreign corporations and commercial and industrial concerns with headquarters in Mexico City and unwilling loans from Mexican haciendados. Huerta had all the power of the government concentrated in Mexico City in his hands, the support of all the foreign powers with the exception of the United States, and in spite of all he failed. American bankers who had hastily but unwisely loaned several millions to General Huerta in the forlorn hope that he could prove a second Diaz to subdue Mexico, lost faith in the dictator’s ability and sent an agent to offer six million dollars to Carranza if he would promise to guarantee Huerta’s loans. It goes without saying that the offer was rejected.