It is quite true that the landing of American marines meant intervention, but President Wilson had declared that it was done against General Huerta, the Dictator, and not against the Mexican people; that American soldiers would be satisfied to occupy the Mexican port until the usurper was driven out. To make the average Mexican understand this complicated situation, and to convince the Americans that Carranza’s protest was not only necessary but was the only manly and patriotic act possible for any Mexican leader, was the task which befell Sr. Zubáran. The lifting of the embargo on arms and ammunition at the border, without arousing the hostility of the War Department in Washington, was another difficult mission. To prevent the Mexican constitutionalists from crossing the American border, thereby playing into the hands of Huerta, was as perilous and risky a game as putting out a lighted fuse near a powder magazine. A talented writer and lawyer, Don Luis Cabrera, ably assisted Rafael Zubáran. The sympathetic attitude of President Wilson and Secretary Bryan helped to crown the efforts with success. Also, the unofficial and friendly co-operation of ex-Governor Lind was of incalculable value to the Mexican diplomats. But any other less experienced and less discreet personality, a mind less acute, keen and masterly, would have failed ignominiously. Americans as well as Mexicans are discovering that diplomatic victories, although silent and modest, are as effective and useful as military achievements. CHAPTER IX THE CONSTITUTIONALISTS IN PARIS Although the diplomatic and financial battle for great loans of the Huerta régime was waged and lost in the United States, as a result of the attitude of the Wilson administration, Huerta was nevertheless enabled to make a loan in Wall Street, ostensibly to pay the interest on the Railroad Merger. The real battle for financial assistance, however, was fought in Paris. The Parisian bankers were always favorably inclined to the existing governments of Mexico. Diaz had always been considered financially solvent, with Limantour at his side. The French and English bankers, who had made fortunes on Mexican loans, always spoke with regret and almost pique at the overthrow of “the grand old man.” Foreign bankers not being by nature sentimental or radical, had no sympathy or understanding for the tremendous popular upheaval in Mexico. The whole great libertarian movement was quite misunderstood or ignored. The Huerta régime seemed like a reversion to the good old fat times under Limantour. Huerta exhibited all the ear-marks of the strong man on horseback. To the superficial bankers, the Mexican Caracalla was bound to stay and ask for more loans, and offer more profits.