Though the object of the campaign had been gained when the Russians recrossed the Pruth, the allied Powers, active agents in the war, had resolved on a mode of reaching Russia. They had determined to carry the war into the Crimea, and capture Sebastopol. This was no sudden resolve. It grew naturally, and, one may say, inevitably out of the war itself. The object of the war was, first, the defence of the Sultan's territory; next, the placing of the territory in security. But there were other means essential to complete success. For a quarter of a century all military observers had seen the military importance of the Crimea. This peninsula, united to the mainland only by the Isthmus of Perekop, and the sandy ledge of Arabat, was the seat of enormous power. At its southern extremity, within a few hours' sail of Constantinople, stood Sebastopol, upon an inlet of the sea forming an excellent harbour. The Russian Government had spent millions in constructing here a series of fortresses impregnable to a maritime attack, and within the harbour and on the shores of a creek running southward they had built vast docks, overlooked by extensive barracks for sailors and soldiers. Long before the phrase was used in Parliament or by statesmen, soldiers had come to regard Sebastopol as a "standing menace" to the Turkish empire; and at the very outbreak of war, the Duke of Newcastle, British War Minister, had directed the attention of Lord Raglan to this point. But the military men, knowing how precarious are operations based on the sea, were doubtful of success. Very little trustworthy information respecting the obstacles in the way, and the numerical strength of the Russian army in the Crimea, could be obtained. Lord Raglan could get none. The French had none. The British Cabinet, looking to all the circumstances, seeing that the allied fleets had entire control of the Black Sea, and that any reinforcements sent to the Crimea must march thither by Perekop, sure that Austrian battalions would cover the road to Constantinople, pressed upon their ally the project of an invasion of the Crimea. The nation went entirely with them in this. Being responsible, they naturally hesitated longer than those who were not responsible; but it is not true to say, as Mr. Kinglake says, either that the _Times_ brought about the decision, or that the Government merely obeyed the popular voice. Those who were responsible for the expedition were the Cabinet, the Parliament, the people--in short, the British nation. And the nation was right. For unless Sebastopol and the naval power of Russia in the Euxine were destroyed, a treaty of peace would have been a mere truce devoid of any sound security either to Turkey or to Europe. It is really puerile to contend that Russia could determine the war by relinquishing the Principalities. The wrongful act which led her there was only a symbol, a manifestation of the existence of a state of things injurious to Europe.