So ended the first day's march. The Allies bivouacked on the south bank of the Bulganâk; and, in order to guard against a flank attack, the British divisions faced to the eastward, that is, nearly at right angles to their line of march. During the evening Marshal St. Arnaud visited Lord Raglan, whose headquarters were in a posthouse on the Bulganâk. What passed at this interview is painfully uncertain. It is said that the French marshal brought with him a plan for attacking a position he had not seen; that he proposed to turn both flanks; one division of his own army and the Turks sweeping round the Russian left, and the whole of the British round their right, while the remainder of the French fell upon and demolished the centre. It is said also that Lord Raglan did not assent to or dissent from this plan, yet that the French marshal left with an impression that it was to be executed. How he came by the impression, one can never know; but this one can know, that Lord Raglan ought not to have allowed Marshal St. Arnaud to leave him with any doubts on his mind. He ought to have distinctly explained that he could assent to no plan until he knew what was to be attacked. He ought to have said in plain language--and he could use plain language--that the plan of a battle must be determined by the nature of the enemy's position, the number of troops by which it was held, and the mode in which they were distributed. The allied commanders were seven miles from the enemy. Neither had seen him, nor his position, nor how he held his position. In these circumstances the proceeding of Marshal St. Arnaud was absurd; and in plain, but polite language, he should have been told so. The dawn of the 20th of September was soft, balmy, and sunny. The troops were afoot early, and soon under arms. Far away on the right the smoke above the cliffs showed that the war-steamers were on the alert, and prepared to work on that flank. Next to the sea, in execution of that part of the marshal's plan not open to objection, General Bosquet, about six o'clock, began to lead forth his division in two columns, followed by four Turkish battalions. He moved on for an hour, and then halted, just as the centre should have moved, to be followed by the British. But the British were not ready. It is said they should have been in line about seven. Whence arose the delay? Some of it must, no doubt, be set down to the constitutional slowness of the British temperament; some to that imperfect concert which is the bane of a divided command. The remainder was caused, undoubtedly, by the fact that the British, in consequence of the arrangements made overnight, had to effect a great change in their array before they could begin to march. Then, that the two armies might be in close proximity, so as to present an unbroken front, the whole had to move obliquely to the right. These evolutions necessarily took up a great deal of time.