Catholic World, Vol. 24, October, 1876, to March, 1877: A Monthly Magazine of General Literature and Science — John Shaqi
Catholic World, Vol. 24, October, 1876, to March, 1877: A Monthly Magazine of General Literature and ScienceVarious
Religion
Catholic World, Vol. 24, October, 1876, to March, 1877: A Monthly Magazine of General Literature and Science
Various
Catholic Church -- Periodicals
It will be seen from this statement that Dr. Mivart regards his
opponents as having laid the basis of their systems on the quicksands
of the most radical scepticism; for certainly, if the fact of a το ἐγω
be called in question, all knowledge must go by the board, its
containing subject being no better than a myth. Those casting a doubt
upon the truth of this proposition are by themselves happily styled
Agnostics, or know-nothings, and Dr. Mivart includes in the category
such distinguished names as Hamilton, Mansel, Mill, Lewes, Spencer,
Huxley, and Bain. These writers, one and all, have repeatedly asserted
the relativity of our knowledge――_i.e._, its merely phenomenal
character. They do not deny that we possess knowledge, but that we can
predicate nothing as to its absolute truth. They claim, indeed,
themselves to have sounded the whole diapason of human knowledge, but
they regard it only as a mirage which appears real to the eye whilst
beholding it, but is none the less a mirage in itself. Dr. Mivart
tersely points out the absurdity of this principle of the agnostic
philosophy by stating that either this knowledge is absolute――_i.e._,
objectively valid――or has no corresponding reality outside of the
mind, in which case it represents nothing――_i.e._, is no knowledge at
all. Those, then, who insist upon the relativity of all knowledge are
“in the position of a man who saws across the branch of a tree on
which he actually sits, at a point between himself and the trunk.” For
if our knowledge be purely relative, we know it but relatively, and
that relative knowledge of it is in turn relative, and so on _ad
infinitum_. In other words, if we assert of our knowledge that it is
relative――_i.e._, purely subjective――we affirm an objective fact; for
however much the facts of the mind be subjective in relation to the
objects represented, they become objective in regard to the mind
viewing them as the term point of knowledge; so that to affirm of
_all_ knowledge that it is purely relative is equal to affirming that
the knowledge we have of that knowledge is not the knowledge thereof,
but a similar modification of the mind having no business to look for
anything beyond itself. This surely is a _reductio ad absurdum_; yet
such threads and thrums are made the warp and woof of so-called
scientific philosophy.
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