This conclusion is thoroughly justified, but not altogether in the way that one is inclined to assume. For one reason, the cavalry is now supplied with an excellent firearm, which its mobility enables it to employ against the most sensitive parts of an enemy's line of battle. For another, the composition of modern armies offers, as I have frequently said, many new possibilities of success. Newly raised levies, such as will often have to take their place in the great armies of the day, cannot possess the same steadiness as standing permanent troops. They are, according to experience, very sensitive to moral impressions, and will often enough, when shaken in battle, offer a tempting and suitable object of attack to the cavalry. At the same time, the fact remains that, by reason of its relative numerical weakness, cavalry can no longer retain its former importance in the battle, and that the manner of its intervention in the fight must often be of a very different nature from what it has been in the past. On the other hand, the duty of cavalry in the sphere of reconnaissance has increased in importance. For all strategical movements the main body of the modern army demands considerably more time and, generally also, comprehensive preparatory measures. If, therefore, intelligence as to the disposition of the enemy is to be of use in operations, it follows that it must be procured at the earliest possible moment. Whoever gets the earliest and best information possesses nowadays a far greater advantage than formerly, when, with the small armies of the day, movements and combinations of force could often be successfully carried out in the immediate presence of the enemy's army. These are indeed still possible in occasional cases and where sufficient depth of formation is maintained, and it is this circumstance that has made early and full intelligence, combined with successful screening of one's own movements, one of the most important factors of success.