It will also be possible for the regiment to operate dismounted against weaker hostile detachments. If relative strength allows, at least a squadron should be detached to guard the led horses and to carry out reconnaissance duties. In the defence on foot, with ample ammunition and every available rifle in the firing-line, the regiment represents a formidable fighting force, even when obliged to detach one, or even two squadrons, for reconnaissance and for the protection of the flanks and the led horses. In the fight of smaller bodies of all arms, a regiment will frequently be able to intervene in a most effective manner by a timely charge, from which considerable results may often be expected, especially during pursuit of a retreating and shaken enemy. In such cases the formation of lines for attack will frequently be superfluous, and a broad enveloping formation may be adopted. The _brigade_ of two regiments is numerically too weak of itself to carry out strategical missions, and to be able to engage in the independent actions they demand. The heavy drains on its strength which such missions generally entail will usually weaken the fighting power so much that the brigade will no longer be in a condition to engage an opponent of any strength who may have to be dealt with by mounted or dismounted action, or the two in combination. At the same time, circumstances may lead to a brigade being _forced_ to carry out an independent rôle. It will then have to reconnoitre with great care, so that it may only embark on a decisive encounter with a full knowledge of the situation. Otherwise, in view of its small offensive power, it will run a great risk of suffering defeat, especially when dismounted. In the defence on foot, on the other hand, a brigade may be regarded as an important factor of strength, capable of successfully resisting an enemy of considerable superiority, as long as its flanks are protected and the led horses do not require too large an escort. On approaching the enemy, the brigade must form column of troops from column of route in good time and the regiments must be deployed on the frontage and in the formations demanded by the situation. In such cases a reserve must always be detailed. The allotment of different rôles in the fight to the various regiments or groups will form the framework for the tactical deployment. In all attacks the brigade or its component parts must always adopt the formation in lines. Where there is blind ground to a flank, a forward échelon must be formed which will co-operate concentrically in the charge. In the attack on foot, too, it will often be advantageous to échelon detachments forward under due protection, in order to envelop the enemy's position. In the combat of detachments of all arms, and especially in pursuit, considerable performances must be expected of a brigade. A timely charge or the employment of its fire power in an effective direction may bring about a decision.