The _division_ of six regiments, under circumstances where its full strength can be employed in the charge, represents, even against troops using the rifle, a very considerable fighting power, which can, if judiciously handled and launched at the right moment, have a decisive effect, even in a battle of armies. In independent missions it must be remembered that a complete regiment of four squadrons with 15 files per troop will represent 400 rifles at most. In war, however, this figure will never be reached. Wastage on the march and the provision of the necessary detachments and patrols, weaken squadrons very considerably. We must further remember that in every great battle a mounted reserve will always have to be detailed, while, in addition to this, detachments such as reconnoitring squadrons, escorts to transport, reporting centres, and signal stations, will generally fail to rejoin in time for the battle. Thus the division will seldom actually be able to reckon on more than 1,000 to 1,500 rifles in the firing-line. Even counting on the co-operation of artillery and machine-guns, which the enemy will also have at his disposal, this represents no great offensive strength. It is therefore necessary to be quite clear in our minds that only weak detachments can be attacked with prospect of success. A cavalry division is greatly handicapped by these circumstances in carrying out the rôle which may be assigned to it in the course of operations. The resistance of a body of equal strength where circumstances demand a dismounted attack can thus never be overcome. Mounted, however, it is quite another matter. A well-trained German cavalry division, handled according to sound tactical principles and schooled to charge in close formation, may attack even a stronger enemy regardless of consequences. Should the task at issue demand a larger force, several divisions must be united in a _cavalry corps_. In the battle of all arms such a corps, either by the charge or by employment of its fire power, may aim at decisive results. For the conduct of independent strategic missions fire power is an important factor. As in this case the number of men detached, etc., will be divided between the divisions, a strength of 3,500 rifles can at times be reached in a corps of two divisions. For the division, as for the corps, the framework of the tactical deployment depends upon the commander's tactical plan, as too does the allotment of duties in the fight to the various units, divisions, brigades, and regiments, or to the tactical groups, advanced guard, main body, reserve, etc., and any attempt at retaining the command in one hand is obviously out of the question. Stress has already been laid on the necessity for early deployment, and once this is effected, the various subdivisions of the force must take their own independent measures for carrying out the rôles that devolve upon them.