On the other hand, neither in the fight of the independent cavalry nor in the great battle should a unit be allowed to become isolated in the combat. The necessary combination must always be preserved. United action, however, is only possible if subordinate leaders never lose sight of the general purpose of the fight, and continually bear in mind the necessary interchangeable relations of the various tactical methods. In war it will seldom be possible either to undertake or to carry out the very best course of action, but will generally be unnecessary, for we may certainly count on numerous errors and vacillations on the part of the enemy, especially in the case of cavalry warfare. It is of far greater importance that any plan once undertaken should be energetically carried through to a conclusion. Success in war is first and foremost a matter of character and will. The indomitable will to conquer carries with it a considerable guarantee of success. The determination to win, cost what it may, is therefore the first and greatest quality required of a cavalry leader--and the offensive is the weapon with which he can best enforce his will. FOOTNOTES: [Footnote 12: "By reason of its firearms, cavalry is capable also of _dismounted action_. It is thus in a position--and especially so when supported by horse artillery and machine-guns--to offer resistance to detachments of all arms, or to cause them serious loss by unexpected fire-action. Nor need it refrain from attack, should the situation require it. It will often have to combine dismounted with mounted action."] [Footnote 13: "In combination with the cavalry combat, the _fire effect of the carbine_ may be employed on occasions. Thus the occupation of _points-d'appui_ by portions of the advanced guard may often provide favourable and, at times, indispensable preliminaries to the deployment of a division. The support of carbine fire may be possible and useful even during contact."] [Footnote 14: "The Crisis of the Confederacy," by Cecil Battine.] [Footnote 15: "By reason of its firearms, cavalry is capable also of _dismounted action_. It is thus in a position--and especially so when supported by horse artillery and machine-guns--to offer resistance to detachments of all arms, or to cause them serious loss by unexpected fire-action. Nor need it shrink from attacking, should the situation require it. It will often have to combine dismounted with mounted action."] [Footnote 16: "Cavalry will often be obliged to clear the way for further activity by means of dismounted _attack_. Attempts also on the hostile lines of communication (such as the capture of railway stations or magazines, the destruction of important engineering works, or the capture of isolated posts, etc.) will certainly involve such attacks. On the battle field, however, dismounted cavalry will rarely be pushed forward."]