It lies deeply embedded in human nature that he who feels himself the weaker will act on the defensive. Both opponents will often endeavour to exploit the advantages of the defensive. It frequently happens during manoeuvres that the cavalry endeavours to seize some commanding position, and so force the enemy to attack it under the fire of artillery posted there. The other side, however, may make corresponding endeavours. An indecisive artillery duel is the usual result of such efforts. But if such action is frequent in peace, how much more frequent will it be under the pressure of responsibility which war brings with it, especially where one side is tactically the weaker? It requires an enormous moral strength, personal influence over troops, and firmness of character to be able to maintain the offensive spirit, even after an unfavourable conflict, and continually to invoke the ultimate decision anew. In general, it may be relied upon that defence will be carried out according to tactical defensive principles, and that with the firearm. There can be no doubt upon that point to those who have studied human nature by the light of military history. Our probable opponents, too, will certainly often advance dismounted. At all events they are endeavouring to strengthen cavalry divisions by cyclist battalions and infantry, and perhaps by mounted infantry, and thereby already show a remarkable inclination to conduct the fight, even of cavalry, with the firearm, and only to use their horses as a means of mobility, as was the custom of the Boers in Africa. The rôle of cavalry in the fight will then apparently consist of a combination of the various methods of fighting. In explanation of this view I would cite a well-known example. The task of the German army cavalry in the battle of Mars la Tour was to relieve the left flank of the German army by a determined attack against the right of the French, and thus to bring the apprehended advance of the enemy to a standstill. It did not accomplish this task, but was satisfied with trying conclusions with the French cavalry; but did not either win a decisive victory over the latter nor reap the necessary tactical benefit from the action. It certainly maintained its superiority over the enemy, but it made no attempt to interfere decisively in the course of the battle itself. This honour was left to the 1st Dragoons of the Guard. But if we assume for a moment that this cavalry, after driving the French from the field, had made an attempt to operate further against the right flank of the French army, Cissey's Division, how would matters have stood?