The French infantry had occupied the Gréyère Farm as a support to their right flank. The Chasseurs d'Afrique, on the other hand, who initiated the cavalry fight, retired after they had been beaten by the 13th Dragoons in a northerly direction, and occupied with dismounted fire the southern edge of a small wood near Ville sur Yron, which the French call Bois de la Grange and the German official history Bois de Gréyère. It is bordered on the south by the plateau of Ville sur Yron. The dismounted Chasseurs here formed an échelon behind the right flank of the French infantry. How should the German cavalry have acted under such circumstances in order to gain contact with the right flank of the French infantry so protected? The strongly occupied Gréyère Farm commanded the crossing of the Fond de la Cuve, which stretches in a northerly direction from Mars la Tour towards Château Moncel, while to the north the wood occupied by the Chasseurs limited freedom of movement. What else remained but a determined attack of both objectives and their capture, and that on foot? Artillery alone would not have sufficed against the Gréyère Farm, for this point would have had to be strongly occupied with riflemen, and nowadays also with machine guns, before the crossing of the Fond de la Cuve which the farm commanded, and which divided our cavalry from the French infantry, could be accomplished. We can thus see that even in the action of cavalry in battle the combination of the several methods of fighting can scarcely, if ever, be avoided. In flank and rear, also, the opponent will endeavour to secure himself by occupying points of support as soon as he becomes aware of our intention to operate in these directions. Our cavalry must thus be continually prepared to pave the way by dismounted action for the mounted combat. Our new Regulations mention quite incidentally (390)[12] that cavalry will often have to combine mounted and dismounted action, that "on occasions" also, in combination with shock action, dismounted cavalry must be ready to hold supporting points to cover deployment or to co-operate in the engagement (438).[13] I do not think that this passing mention of the importance of combination of the two methods of fighting of the cavalry sufficiently emphasises the matter. After due reflection over all the circumstances appertaining to the question, I am, on the other hand, firmly convinced that the mutual relationship between the fight on foot and on horseback will give the modern cavalry combat its peculiar character. This relationship will _always_ have to be reckoned with, and all tactical considerations must be guided by it.