General von Bernhardi very wisely says that it is not a question whether cavalrymen should fight mounted or dismounted, but whether they are prepared and determined to take their share in the decision of an encounter and to employ the whole of their strength and mobility to this end. In our training during the last few years I have endeavoured to impress upon all ranks that when the enemy's cavalry is overthrown, our cavalry will find more opportunities of using the rifle than the cold steel, and that dismounted attacks will be more frequent than charges with the _arme blanche_. By no means do I rule out as impossible, or even unlikely, attacks by great bodies of mounted men against other arms on the battlefield. But I believe that such opportunities will occur comparatively rarely, and that undue prominence should not be accorded to them in our peace training, to the detriment of much more solid advantages which may be gained by other means. I think that every one who reads this book will understand that the sphere of action of cavalry is steadily widening, and is, at the same time, making increased demands as the years go on upon all ranks of the arm. Those who wish to recall what cavalry has done in the past, should read and reread "The Achievements of Cavalry," by Field-Marshal Sir Evelyn Wood, one of the very few soldiers in the Army who has taken part as a combatant in European warfare. Sir Evelyn Wood's war record probably surpasses that of any other officer in the Army. His knowledge of horses and his horsemanship are second to none, and though seventy-two years of age, he is still one of the hardest and straightest riders to hounds in England. It should be a constant encouragement to the cavalry that such an experienced and sagacious leader should entertain such a firm faith in the destinies of an arm with which he is so thoroughly conversant. * * * * * A few words in conclusion. We hear it said, and see it written, that we ought not to accept any guidance from military Europe, because our own experience of war has been so considerable that we can learn nothing from Europe which we do not know better ourselves. The truth is, that since the Crimean War we have had little or no experience of the kind of effort which will be required of us when next we meet the trained army of a European Power. In deluding ourselves with the false notion that our campaigns of the last fifty years represent the sum of military wisdom, we merely expose our ignorance and conceit, and do our utmost not only to cause disaster, but to invite it.