The possible participation of the civilian inhabitants of the invaded Nation in the War will hamper most severely all forms of Cavalry action other than on the battle-field. In intersected districts it may, indeed, suffice to paralyze completely the execution of all patrolling duties; and thus the offensive finds itself confronted by a new and permanent element of danger and delay, whose gravity we may estimate by the events which occurred in the latter portion of the Franco-German War, and we may be quite certain that in future all such experiences will be very much intensified. Lastly, the fall in the numerical proportion of the Cavalry to the other Arms is all to our disadvantage. The greater numbers of the latter cover larger areas, and whether to cover these or to reconnoitre them, it will be necessary to embrace far larger spaces, notwithstanding our relatively smaller numbers--_i.e._, on each square mile we shall only be able to employ, on an average, a largely reduced number of patrols, etc. Tactically this want of numbers again affects us. If the necessity to intervene arises, not only have we better firearms against us, but relatively a larger number of troops. Each tactical advantage secured will thus exercise far less effect than formerly upon our opponent, since the fraction of the enemy's force ridden down represents a smaller proportion of his whole Army. If an Infantry Brigade, one of a force of ten Army Corps, is annihilated, the effect is not nearly so far-reaching as if this Brigade formed part of an Army of two or even three Corps. If in these changed relations there are obviously factors which materially limit the tactical importance of Cavalry, and which must make the solution of their strategical tasks far more difficult, on the other side we find opportunities in the probable phenomena of a future War which, though less obvious, nevertheless on investigation lead us to the conclusion that the importance of the Arm is even greater than formerly, opening for it a wider sphere of activity, and even on the battle-field revealing new chances of success. Let us consider these opportunities more closely. The greater the pitch of nervous tension to which men are wrought up in battle, the greater the pitch of excitement reached, the more decisive will be the reaction when the flood-tide of defeat overwhelms them.